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Abstract
This thesis consists of three chapters on Economic Growth and Informational Frictions. Chapter 1
investigates the relation between financial development, R&D expenditure and aggregate growth.
It provides empirical evidence that financial development has a large positive effect on both growth
and R&D, and that the effect of financial development on growth is likely to be explained by its effect
on R&D. I also study a general equilibrium model in with predictions which are consistent with
the empirical regularities mentioned above. In particular, aggregate growth increases as financial
development increases. The model also predicts that financial development produces large welfare
gains, specially at low levels of financial development. Finally I show that the model studied
suggests that R&D policy is welfare improving and that policy should be conditional on the level
of financial development.
Chapter 2 gives an empirical assessment of the world income distribution. In particular, I take
a CES production function implied by a Skill-Biased technical change model and fit this production
function to the data. The calibration results give evidence of the importance of including different
skills to account for the observed income differences over time. I also show that the calibration
exercise is validated by the estimated values of the parameters of the model.
In Chapter 3 I study a model of entry under uncertainty. In particular, I analyze an economy
where potential entrants make entry decisions after receiving noisy signals of the true demand
levels for the different sectors of the economy. I show that equilibrium strategies depend on the
precision of the signals received by agents. When precision is low the equilibrium of the game is
a pure strategy equilibrium where agents enter the sector for which they receive a higher signal.
On the other hand when precision is high the optimal strategy is to randomize over which sector
to enter. The model also highlights the non-monotonic relations between the discrepancy between
the equilibrium and efficient entry levels and both the precision of the signal and the true relative
demand between sectors.
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Chapter 1
Financial Development, R&D and
Growth
1.1 Introduction
A large literature emphasizes the positive effects of financial development on economic growth.
Figure 1, which shows a plot of the aggregate growth rate in real GDP between 1980 to 2005 for
146 countries against private credit, provides evidence of a positive correlation between financial
development and growth at the aggregate level. The same pattern emerges when one looks at the
relation between financial development and firm level growth in sales (Figure 2). One of the possible
channels by which financial development could affect growth is by giving firms financial slack and
allowing them to invest in growth-enhancing activities. Figure 3, for example, shows that financial
development and R&D expenditure are positively correlated. This suggests that understanding
the relation between financial development, R&D and growth is very important when trying to
understand the process of economic growth. The challenge when trying to interpret these results
as causal comes from the fact that measures of financial development are likely to be correlated with
other country characteristics affecting growth and R&D. Robinson (1952), for example, argues that
entrepreneurial activity paves the way for financial development, suggesting a potential feedback
from economic development to financial development. There are two main contributions of the
present paper. First it provides empirical and theoretical evidence that financial development
affects growth through the effect it has on R&D investment by firms. Second, it studies the effect
that this mechanism has on the optimal design of policy.
This paper provides evidence of an economically important effect of financial development on
both growth and R&D. To address the endogeneity concern raised above I use a difference-in-
difference strategy which exploits the idea that financial development should affect differentially
the growth and R&D investment of firms operating in sectors with different needs for external
funds. This idea is based on the following intuition. Financial underdevelopment will make
raising funds to finance growth-enhancing activities, such as R&D, harder. This problem will be
specially relevant for firms operating in industries that, for technological reasons, require larger
amounts of liquid funds to invest. For this reason, an increase in financial development should
have a larger effect on growth and R&D expenditure for firms operating in sectors with higher
dependence on external financing. This intuition was first introduced by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) to analyze the relation between financial development and industry growth. To study the
empirical relation between financial development, R&D expenditure and growth, I use firm level
data from Compustat (Global and North America), and find that differences in growth rates and
R&D expenditure between firms in sectors with high and low financial dependence are higher as
financial development increases: This result is consistent with the results found using industry level
data (Rajan and Zingales (1998)). The findings support the idea that both R&D and growth are
affected by financial development. I show these reduced form findings are robust after controlling
for a variety of firm level characteristics. I also show that the results are robust to alternative
measures of financial dependence, alternative measures of financial development and to the inclusion
of various country characteristics. Finally I point at the important relation of financial development
and firm dynamics.
The results obtained when estimating these reduced form relations point at the importance of
the effect of financial development on growth and R&D. In particular, the predicted difference
in growth between a firm operating in the machinery industry and a firm operating in the paper
industry (industries located at the 75th and 25th of financial dependence, respectively) is 0.9%
higher in Australia than in India (countries located at the 75th and 25th of financial development,
respectively). A similar exercise suggests a 5.6% difference in R&D expenditure. These numbers
suggest the economic importance of the effect of financial development on growth and R&D.
The reduced form relations also highlight the possibility that the effect of financial development
on firm growth is driven by the effect it has on R&D. To test this hypothesis, I run the baseline
specification for the growth regression controlling for R&D expenditure. I find that once we
control for R&D, the interaction between financial development and financial dependence has no
-1Atitical significance in explaining differences in growth. One caveat to this finding is the potential
endo jgeneity of R&D and growth. To take this into account, I follow two approaches. First, I
Cw a 2SLS strategy where I use past values of R&D as an instrument. Second, I use variations
rs countries and time of the tax component of the user cost of capital as an instrument for
R0 expenditure. The results support the hypothesis that financial development affects growth
rougrh the effect it has on R&D.
h. ideas behind the methodology described above raise questions which are important for
iderstanding of the relation between growth and financial development. Which industries
i fs are those which rely more on external financing and what is driving these differences?
To uderstand the channels through which financial dependence affects R&D and consequently,
romb, I study an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model. Using a infinite-horizon will be
,,ful to capture the dynamics of R&D decisions by firms and the interaction of these dynamics
with he level of financial development, a feature which is present in the data. In the model firms
m eiterogenous in two dimensions: they differ in their labor productivity and in a technological
rmeter which affects the R&D production function. Differences in labor productivity are
m d;diin rnost Schumpeterian growth models. The novel ingredient is the heterogeneity in the
o n production function which is sector specific. There are differences between these two firm
arijstics. On the one hand, firms can improve their labor productivity, and therefore reduce
nal cost, by engaging in R&D investment. The R&D technological parameter, on the
hmJ nd, is constant over the entire life of the firm and can be interpreted as the R&D ability
ascd to the sector the firm operates in. In the model firms operating in high R&D ability
* willW 'be growing faster and investing more in R&D, which as the empirical results suggest
2 Lted to higher financial dependence. At the heart of the model is the assumption that firms
o borrow in order to finance their R&D expenditure and they can only borrow a proportion
I tii profits. I prove the existence of a steady-state general equilibrium in this economy and
barat erize the properties of R&D for different labor productivity-ability pairs. I find that firms
vh igher R&D ability invest more on R&D which implies these will be the more financially
doUtat firms in the economy.
In orHer to address if the model can match the empirical facts mentioned above, I use numerical
Sodls to solve for the steady-state general equilibrium of the economy and find three patterns
4vint with the data:
*Jiate growth is increasing in financial development,
ii) differences in expected growth between firms in the high R&D ability sector and firms in the
low R&D ability sector are increasing in financial development, and
iii) differences in R&D expenditure between firms in the high R&D ability sector and firms in
the low R&D ability sector are increasing in financial development.
The results also suggest that financial development increases welfare and the gains in welfare
are larger for low levels of financial development.
The model used sheds light on the design of policy. In particular it shows there are three
dimensions which the policy maker should consider when designing policy. On the one hand,
even without financial constraints, one would expect policy to be targeted specially towards small
firms operating in the high R&D ability sector. On the other hand, once I introduce financial
constraints, this conclusion is reinforced as small firms in the high R&D ability sector, which are
the ones who contribute more to growth, are also the ones hit harder by financial constraints. I
restrict the analysis to uniform and size-dependent policies and find that the optimal uniform R&D
subsidy is decreasing in financial development. This result highlights the role of subsidies in both
increasing growth and in relaxing the liquidity constraints. I then show that a size-dependent R&D
subsidy yields higher welfare than a uniform subsidy. A novel result is the shape of the optimal
R&D subsidy. More specifically, I find that in the absence of financial frictions, the optimal
R&D subsidy is non-decreasing in labor productivity. This result emerges as a consequence of the
positive correlation between labor productivity and the firm's R&D ability. Once we introduce
financial frictions this result does not necessarily hold. In particular, for low levels of financial
development the optimal R&D subsidy will be decreasing in a firm's labor productivity. In this
case the "liquidity" effect of subsidies dominates the "ability composition" effect of subsidies.
This paper contributes to a large body of literature which emphasizes the relation between
financial development and growth'. King and Levine (1993), following Goldsmith (1969), were
among the first to study empirically the effect of financial development on aggregate growth finding
a positive correlation between the two. Their study, however, does not take into account the
potential feedback from aggregate growth to financial development. In order to study the causal
effect of financial development on growth, Beck et al. (2000) use an instrumental variable dynamic
panel approach to correct for the potential endogeneity of financial development. Consistent with
King and Levine, they find a positive effect of financial development on aggregate growth. A
second strategy used to identify the causal relation of financial development on growth was first
For a detailed review of the literature see Levine (2003).
proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Using a difference-in-difference approach they find that
financial development increases growth specially in industries with stronger dependence of external
finance. This methodology provides further insights as it highlights a potential mechanism through
which financial development affects growth. Since this influential work, several authors have used
this empirical strategy to address similar questions. Raddatz (2006), for example, uses the same
methodology to highlight the effect of financial constraints in sectoral volatility. Similarly, Aghion,
Hemous, and Kharroubi (2009) use this methodology to study the effect of cyclical fiscal policy
on sectoral growth and R&D. They find that growth and R&D respond in the same direction to
cyclical policy which is consistent with what I find. In a similar vein, Aghion, et al. (forthcoming)
study the effect of the interaction of financial development and volatility on aggregate growth
and R&D. They find that both R&D expenditure and aggregate growth are more affected by
volatility in countries where financial development is smaller. Both of these papers highlight the
tight link between movements in R&D expenditure and movements in aggregate growth. The
main contribution of the present paper is to take the extra step of addressing wether the effect of
financial development on growth is caused by the effect it has on R&D expenditure.
The present paper also contributes to the endogenous growth literature by highlighting the im-
portance of the interaction between size, R&D technology and financial development in the process
of economic development. On the theoretical side, this paper is closest to Akcigit (2009). The
main difference between the model presented there and this work is the introduction of heterogene-
ity in R&D production and financial constraints. This paper is also related to a large body of
theoretical literature which highlights the positive effect of financial development on growth. Most
of these studies stress the importance that the financial sector has on reducing investment risk and
investment volatility (Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Saint-Paul (1992), Aghion et. al. (2005),
Laeven (2009)). Like Aghion et al. (forthcoming), this paper highlights the role of the financial
sector in providing liquidity for productive activities.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature on R&D policy and state-dependent policy.
This literature typically argues that size-dependent policies are detrimental for the economy as
they misallocate resources (Guner et al. (2008), Restuccia and Rogerson (forthcoming)). On the
other hand, recent work on endogenous growth has highlighted the potential role of size-dependent
policies in improving competition and innovation (Acemoglu and Akcigit (2009), Akcigit (2009)).
This paper shares some of the insights pointed in these two papers. The main contribution here is
to highlight how the presence of financial development shapes the optimal size-dependent policies,
showing that policies which are increasing in size are optimal for high levels of financial development
while policies which are decreasing in size are optimal for low levels of financial development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the econometric analysis
and presents the main empirical findings. Section 3 presents the model and presents the main
theoretical results. Section 4 presents the numerical results and analyzes the general equilibrium
effects of financial constraints on firm level and aggregate growth. Section 5 analyzes the policy
implications of financial constraints on the model. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Empirical Evidence
The objective of this section is to analyze empirically the effect a country's financial development
has on firm level growth and R&D investment. The difficulty of assessing this question is that
measures of financial development are likely to be correlated with other country characteristics
which affect firm growth and R&D decisions. One way to deal with this problem was suggested
in a seminal paper by Rajan and Zingales (1998) (henceforth RZ). Their methodology uses a
difference-in-difference approach which isolates the effect of financial development from other coun-
try characteristics. Using this approach I show three results which are the main findings of this
section. First I show that the interaction between financial development and the financial depen-
dence of a sector has a positive effect on firm level growth. Second, I show that the same pattern
emerges when I analyze the relation between the interaction between financial development and
financial dependence and firm level R&D expenditure. Finally I show evidence that the effect of a
country's financial development on growth is potentially caused by the effect that financial devel-
opment has on R&D and that this effect is significant even after addressing potential endogeneity
concerns.
At the heart of this empirical section lies the hypothesis that firms which are in sectors with
high financial dependence will be more favored by financial development. This methodology,
first studied empirically by RZ, has become popular in recent years (see Raddatz (2006), Aghion,
Hemous and Kharrobi (2009)). The empirical literature, however, has given little convincing
evidence of the channel through which financial development affects growth. The main hypothesis
I test in this section is that one potential channel through which financial development, financial
dependence, and growth interact is through R&D investment by firms.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. First I describe the data I use in detail. Then
1h of the three regressions of interest I present the empirical strategy and the main results,
fmv by robustness checks.
L2.1 Data
Firrm level data
The two main data sources I use are Standard and Poor's Compustat North America Annual and
U rd Poor's Compustat Global Annual, both of which are comparable between each other.
Compistat North America includes information on a large number of publicly held companies in
iSand Canada since 1950, while Compustat Global focuses on publicly held firms in non-US
o non- Canadian marketplace starting in 1987. It includes firms from 98 different countries in all
usmi. I [focus on the period 1987-2006 which is the period of time for which both data sets
t c Since data from Compustat global comes in the domestic currency, I have deflated and
o nvd all monetary items to US dollars. Data for the exchange rates have been taken from the
Inirnational Financial Statistics2
The. literature using the RZ methodology has focused on industry level data. Instead, I use firm
_ a which will allow me to control for country, industry and firm characteristics. The other
i advantage of using firm level data is that it will allow me to treat certain country level
a a~t2-s exogenous to the firm. This will prove useful specially when analyzing the effect of
DIou growth. On the downside, using Compustat has the disadvantage of having only publicly
lA firms which biases the sample towards large firms. As shown on Figure 4, this becomes less of
n saue over time as the average size in the sample becomes smaller. This, plus the increase in the
size over time of both data sets, suggests that Compustat has become more representative
4 - population of firms. I follow the common practice of focusing only on industrial firms, where
m nd stries using 4-digit International Standard Industry Classification codes (ISIC REV.2).
T .rdeinition of industry is consistent with the one used in RZ and Raddatz (2006).
my goal is to analyze the long run effects of financial development, I will use variables
ae over 5 year periods. Other options would be to use yearly data or to aggregate over
whle sample period. The former could be capturing the effect of short-run variation which
Snu to isolate from. On the other hand, the latter could be capturing other long run trends
conmy which could contaminate the effect of financial development. For this reason, I
n ies who have changed the exchange rate during the period of analysis, I have obtained the exchange
(uS different sources.
construct aggregate measures of the variables of interest for a given interval. I define Sales and
R&D expenditure for interval T as the average of the variables over the interval. Age is defined
as as the number of years from the initial public offering date of firm i and the initial year of the
interval, t. A firm's growth rate for interval T will be calculated as the annualized growth rate
in sales for the period. I also construct a proxy for the book value of a firm. This is defined as
the assets held by the firm at the beginning of interval T minus the liabilities of the firm at the
beginning of interval T.
Financial Dependence
Compustat North America is also used to construct the measure of financial dependence of a
sector. In particular I follow the methodology in RZ in constructing an industry specific measure
of financial dependence as the median ratio of capital expenditure over sales for firms in the US 3. I
construct the measure for the 1987-2006 period which is the period of time used in the regressions
below. I also construct the same measure for the period 1970-1987 both as a robustness check of
4
the stability of the measure and for use in the 2SLS estimation
As mentioned in Raddatz (2006) the use of US firms can be justified by the observation that
the US financial markets are among the most developed in the world. The assumption I make is
that a firm's financial dependence affects not only how much a firm can borrow for working capital
and capital expenditure, but also how much a firm can invest in R&D. One concern one might
have is that the measure of financial dependence used in RZ is not capturing the right technological
difference in R&D investment across sectors. To test this I construct an equivalent R&D financial
dependence measure. The two measures are positively correlated with a correlation coefficient of
0.4.
Financial Development and Other Country Measures
Measures of financial development come from different sources. The main measure of financial
development I use is private credit as a fraction of GDP, which can be interpreted as the access to
bank loans that firms in a particular country have. The value for this variable is taken directly
from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI) and is the country's average value for
:See Rajan and Zingales (1998) for the especifics of how the measure is constructed.
"As highlighted in RZ, the validity of this methodology rests on two assumptions. First, there is a technological
reason for which certain sectors in the economy rely more on external funds to finance R&D projects. Second, this
industry differences are common across countries and across time.
private credit over GDP during the period 1980-1995. We can think of this measure as the initial
value of financial institutions for each country in the 1987-2006 period.
When doing robustness checks I use two other measures of financial development used in the
literature. The first is a country's stock market capitalization and the second is a country's
accounting standards. Stock Market Capitalization, taken from Beck et al. (2001), is a measure of
the size of a country's equity markets with respect to GDP. The second alternative measure used
is quality of accounting standards. This measure is obtained from La Porta et al. (1998) and,
as mentioned in RZ, it captures how easy it will be for firms to raise funds from a wider circle of
investors.
Measures of financial development are likely to contain measurement error and to be correlated
with other country characteristics. In order to control for this potential endogeneity, I use dummy
variables representing a country's legal origin (British, french, German, and Scandinavian) This
instrument, which has been very popular recently in the Political Economy and Law and Finance
literature, is taken from Laporta et al. (1998).
To test the effect of other institutions on growth and R&D, I use PPP adjusted GDP per capita
in 1987 obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. As in Acemoglu and
Johnson (2005) I will instrument GDP per capita by using settler mortality.
Finally, in order to control for the fact that Compustat firms are potentially bigger than a
average firm, I use average employment in each ISIC industry per country. This is obtained from
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (2001), Industrial Statistics Database
(UNIDO).
Summary statistics of the variables used are presented in Table I.
1.2.2 Results
Financial Dependence and Financial Development: Basic Specification
I begin the empirical analysis by establishing the effect of financial dependence on growth and
R&D. In particular I estimate the following two relations:
gijT k = 1 +w19 + 61T +01 * FDEPj +
+p1 * ageijjr + p * ln (SaleiJTk) + Eiktk
ln(RD/ Sale) ,Tk = a2 + W2k + 62T + 02 * FDEPj +
+p1 * ageijTk -+ P1 * In (SalerjTk) + +eitk
where gijTk is the growth rate of firm i, at interval T, in industry j from country k, ln(RD/Sale)ijTk
is the log of R&D intensity, FDEP is sector j's measure of financial dependence, ageijTk is the
age of firm i at the beginning of interval T, wk, 6T are country and time fixed effects respectively,
and a is a constant. The results are shown in columns (1) and (5) of Table 2. The point estimates
indicate that industries in which financial dependence is higher grow faster and invest more in
R&D than firms with lower financial dependence. If the identification strategy is valid, this would
suggest an important channel through which financial development affects economic growth: it will
benefit more those firms which invest more in R&D and grow faster.
I will now study the effect of financial development on growth and R&D expenditure. To
investigate these effects the following two equations will be estimated:
gijTk = - + Olj + W1k- 61T + 01 * FDEVk* FDEPj +
+P1 * ageiTk + Pi * In (SalezjTk) + Eitk
ln(RD/Sale)ijTk = + 0 2j - W2k + 62T + 02 * FDEVk * FDEPj +
+pl * ageijTk + Pi * In (SalezJTk) + -eitk
where now O1j and 0 2. are industry fixed effects and the term FDEV * FDEPk is the inter-
action between country k's measure of financial development and sector j's measure of financial
dependence. The interaction term will be the object of interest and will be capturing the effect
of financial development on R&D investment and growth. As will be clear in what follows, the
patterns that emerge from these two estimations are very similar. Furthermore, the concerns and
consistency checks of the two reduced form estimations are almost identical. For this reason, in
wh follows I will analyze the two equations simultaneously making clear when one deserves a
different discussion than the other.
Growth, R&D Intensity and Financial Development
(olumn (2) of Table 2 shows the basic OLS regression of the growth regression. Consistent with
h finding in RZ we have that the interaction term is positive and significant, with a point estimate
of 127. The interpretation of this coefficient is that of a cross-partial derivative. In particular,
idicates that the difference in growth rates between firms which operate in a sector with high
financiia dependence compared to ones which operate in a sector with low financial dependence
shoiuld be increasing as the country's financial development increases. In order to get a sense of the
ifagnitude of this coefficient take a firm with average sales (log Sales = 0.0511) in the country at the
75th percentile of financial development, Austria, and and one in the country at the 25th percentile
f4 financial development, India. The coefficient tells us that the predicted differential growth for a
uI located in the 75th percentile of financial dependence (high dependence) compared to a firm
prng i a sector at the 25th percentile of financial dependence (low dependence) in Austria
percentage points per year higher than in India. This magnitude is large and economically
t Column (6) of Table 2 suggests a similar pattern for R&D intensity. To see the practical
riance of the effect of the interaction term on R&D intensity I will perform a similar example
ne above. Take a firm with average size (log Sales = 0.0511) with average R&D intensity
S /Sale) = -3.31) and assume sales grow at 10% annual rate (61.05% in five years) . The
stirnted coefficient of R&D tells us that the predicted differential R&D expenditure for a firm with
rge sales located in the 75th percentile of financial dependence (high dependence) compared
firm operating in a sector at the 25th percentile of financial dependence (low dependence) in
A should be 5.58 percentage points per year higher than in India. This again sheds light on
monmc importance of this channel.
Wasurement Error and Endogeneity
S -wamcern one might have about the previous results for growth and R&D intensity is that
liaeng proxies for financial development and financial dependence which could suffer from
e riement error and bias the estimates. Other concern is that financial development might be
"iegenois to unobserved factors that affect growth. I deal with this concern in Columns (3),
7) ad (8) of Table 2 In columns (3) and (7) of Table 2 I use a 2SLS approach where I
instrument financial development with a country's legal origin. The validity of this instrument lies
in the assumption that the country's legal origin affects growth only through financial development.
For this reason one should take this result with caution as one can argue that a country's legal
origin may affect firm-level growth and R&zD through channels different than the level of financial
development 5 . Columns (4) and (8) of Table 2 use the same instruments as before for financial
development and also instruments financial dependence with the lagged value of the measure. The
estimates for both growth and R&D intensity are still positive and significant and the estimated
values are higher than the OLS counterparts, supporting the attenuation bias conjecture.
Reporting Bias
Another concern in the estimation of the R&D intensity regression is that R&D expenditure is not
reported by many firms in Compustat. To correct for this selection concern, I apply Heckman's
two-step procedure to deal with this issue. The instrument I use in this case is a propensity-to-
report index similar to the one constructed in Akcigit (2009)6. The index is constructed in the
f6llowing way. I choose 12 Compustat items common to all manufacturing firms across countries.
The index is the share of these items that a firm reports in a given year and one would expect
R&D reporting to be positively correlated with this index. Columns (9) and (10) in Table 2 report
the estimates of the selection equation and the outcome equation respectively. Column (9) shows
that the expected sign for the propensity to report index is robust to the assumption that firms
in Compustat misreport items consistently. Column (10) shows that the inverse mills ratio is
significant supporting the hypothesis of selection bias. As for the point estimate of the interaction
term, it increases with respect to the OLS estimate suggesting that not taking into account the
non-reporters dampens the effect of the interaction between financial development and financial
dependence.
Other Measures of Financial Dependence and Financial Development
First I start by investigating how the results are affected by the fact that we are using a particular
measure of financial dependence. We can think of an alternative measure of financial dependence
where we use R&D expenditure as opposed to capital expenditure in the numerator. There are
"See Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) and Aceioglu and Robinson (2005) for a discussion.
'The items used to construct the index in Akcigit (2009) are not always reported in Compustat Global. For this
reason the selected variables I use to construct the index do not match Akeigit (2009).
two problems with this measure of financial dependence. First, this measure is more likely to be
correlated with the error term even when using firm level data. Second, as was discussed above,
misreporting of R&D expenditure will bias this measure towards low financial dependence. For
this reason I will take the results with caution. To try to deal with the first concern I restrict the
analysis in the R&D regressions to non-US firms. The results are presented in column (1) of Table
3 and column (1) of Table 4. The estimated coefficients suggest that the effect of the interaction
term becomes much bigger and is still significant when we use the alternative measure of financial
dependence.
So far I have assumed that technological differences across sectors make some firms rely more
on external financing for all types of expenditures. One possibility is that firms have different
external dependence for different types of expenditure. To study the importance of differences in
external dependence on growth and R&D I run the baseline specifications including two interaction
terms, one using a measure of financial dependence using R&D expenditure and another using a
measure of financial dependence using capital expenditures. Column (2) of Table 3 and Column
(2) of Table 4 show that the two interaction terms are positive and significant suggesting that
both measures of external dependence are important in explaining differences in growth and R&D
expenditure. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients are smaller than the estimated values
of the regressions where each interaction term is considered independently which was expected as
the two measures are positively correlated7.
The measure of financial development I use is a proxy for the true variable of interest which is
access to private credit. In what follows I will check for the robustness of the measure used. In
particular I use two alternative measures of financial development. The first alternative measure
is Stock Market Capitalization. This variable is a measure of how developed the stock market of a
country is. The second alternative measure used is a country's measure of accounting standards.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 and Columns (3) and (4) of Table 4 report the estimates of the
interaction coefficient using the two alternative measures. The estimates for the interaction term
using the alternative measures gives significant coefficients for both growth and R&D intensity,
making us confident that the results are not driven by the choice of an arbitrary proxy.
' The coefficient for the R&D regression when using Non-US firms is 0.0299 and significant at 1% significance level.
Alternative Institutions
One explanation for the findings in the previous subsections is that financial development is captur-
ing the effect of other institutions and country characteristics. For example, Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2001) find evidence that property rights institutions affect long run growth. In a
similar vein Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) argue that measures of contractual institutions affect
private credit as a fraction of GDP. Column (5) of Table 3 and Column (5) of Table 4 show the
OLS estimations of the basic reduced form regression including the interaction of log GDP in 1987
with Financial Dependence, where log GDP is used as a proxy for other institutions. For the
growth regression the added interaction term is positive and significant and the original interac-
tion term remains positive and significant but the estimated value is smaller than in the baseline
regression. For R&D intensity a similar picture emerges. In this case the added interaction term
is positive but not significant while the estimated coefficient for the interaction between financial
dependence and financial dependence is positive and significant but smaller in magnitude. Both
of this results suggest that the baseline estimated coefficients could have been capturing the effect
of other institutions which also affect growth and R&D investment. However, once we control for
these other institutions, the effect of financial development on growth and R&D investment is still
present.
Sample Selection
An additional concern is the use of Compustat. As mentioned above, Compustat firms are expected
to be larger than the average firm in a country. This implies that Compustat firms could potentially
be less constrained than the average firm8 . If our only concern was that firms in Compustat are
bigger but share the same characteristics as an average firm in the economy, this would make our
estimates a lower bound for the true effect of financial development in a firm's growth and R&D
responses. But there could be other unobservables intrinsic to Compustat firms. Using data form
the United Nation's Industrial Statistics Database, I construct a measure of average employment
in industry j for country k and then I construct a measure of a firm's employment relative to the
average firm 9 . Column (6) of Tables 3 and 4 show the results when this extra control is added.
Notice the coefficients for this extra control are positive and significant. This suggests that there
'Compustat firms are publicly held firms, which by definition means they are less constrained in raising funds
than a small firm.
"Average employment is the ratio of total employment and number of establishments.
are firm characteristics in the Compustat sample which makes firms grow faster and invest more
in R&D relative to the average firm. Also notice that in both growth and R&D regressions the
coefficient for the interaction term increases but is still positive and significant and the difference
with respect to the baseline estimate is small. The fact that the coefficients are similar suggests
that the baseline results were not driven by the fact that Compustat firms are different than the
average firm.
Financial Constraints and Size
The previous discussion raises one related question. Many models of financial constraints, like the
seminal paper of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), simplify financial frictions by imposing a borrowing
limit. This borrowing limit will usually depend on a firm's current assets and market value.
Precisely for this reason the effect of financial development on both R&D and growth could be
affected by firm size. To analyze this possibility I study how the interaction term of financial
dependence and financial development is affected by the firm's valuation. As discussed above,
one could expect that the differential effect of financial development on firms with different levels
of financial dependence drops as a firm becomes bigger since the financial constraints the firms
are facing are relaxed with higher firm value. Ideally I would like to measure the firm's market
valuation using observed stock prices and outstanding shares as in Baker and Wurgler (2002) and
Fama and French (2002). Unfortunately, Compustat Global does not have entries for stock prices
and for this reason I use a proxy for a firm's Book Value.
Table 5 shows the results of these regressions. First of all variables are deviations from the mean
which makes the interpretation of the coefficient equivalent as in previous regressions. The main
findings of these regressions are summarized in columns (1) and (4) of Table 5. The results support
the significance of the interaction between Financial Dependence and Financial development for
both R&D intensity and growth. The second thing to notice from these regressions is that the
coefficient of the triple interaction term has the predicted sign but is not significant. One possible
explanation for this pattern is that the relation between the interaction of financial dependence and
financial development, although important, is non monotonic in a firm's size. This would explain
the zero coefficient for the linear approximation. This particular explanation will be supported by
the model presented in the next section.
As discussed above the use of proxies for a firm's value as well as for financial institutions could
be biasing the effects found in columns (1) and (4) of Table 5. To take this into account I run
a 2SLS regression where first I instrument financial development with the country's legal origin
(Columns (2) and (5) of Table 5) and then I also instrument financial dependence with lagged
values (Columns (3) and (6) of Table 5). As can be seen the predictions from columns (1) and
(4) follow through when we instrument financial development and financial dependence. As in
the baseline regressions the coefficient for the interaction term between financial dependence and
financial development increases when using a 2SLS approach.
Financial Constraints, Industry Heterogeneity and Firm Heterogeneity
So far I have exploited sectoral differences in financial dependence in order to identify the effect
of financial development on growth and R&D expenditure. One might also suspect that there is
a differential effect of financial development on firms with different growth profiles. The idea is
that firms which for some technological reason have steeper growth profiles should gain more from
financial development. To analyze this hypothesis I run the following two regressions
gijTk a 1 + Wik + 61T + 1 * FDEVk * highi + T1 * highs + (1.1)
+p 1 * ageijTk + Pi * In (SaleijTk) + itk
ln(RD/Sale 3jTk a2 + W2k + 62T + !2 * FDEVk * high7 + T1 * highi + (1.2)
+p1 * ageijTk + p1 * In (SaleijTk) + +eitk
where high' is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if firm i's average growth is above
the average growth rate in country k. Columns (1) and (4) of Table 6 shows the results for the
OLS estimations. The results indicate that firms with above average growth grow faster and invest
more in R&D that firms with below average growth. Furthermore, the interaction term is positive
and significant which indicates that firms with above average growth benefit more from financial
development. The proposed empirical strategy relies on the assumption that the differential effect
of financial development on firms with different growth profiles works through financial constraints.
To check whether the assumption is plausible I estimate the above regressions for firms with high
and low sales. One expects that the effect interaction term between financial development and the
growth dummy will be stronger for firms with low levels of sales as these will be the more financially
constrained firms in the economy. Columns (2) and (3) compares the estimation results for the
growth regression for firms with sales above the average sales level and below the average sales level
respectively. Similarly columns (6) and (7) do the same exercise for the R&D regression. Columns
(2) and (6) show that when we analyze firms with high levels of sales the interaction term is lower
than the original estimates and non significant. This implies that the differential effect of financial
development on firms with above average growth vanishes when we analyze big firms. Columns (3)
and (7) on the other hand analyze the effect of the interaction term when one looks at firms with
low levels of sales. The results suggest that higher financial development has an important effect
on growth and R&D specially for firms with high growth profiles. Taking these two observations
together confirm the hypothesis that financial development affects growth and R&D by relaxing
the financial constraint of firms.
Columns (4) and (8) analyze the estimation of equations (1.1) and (1.2) when we include
the interaction term for financial development and financial dependence, FDEVk * FDEP. The
estimates indicate an important effect of financial development by favoring both firms with higher
financial dependence as well as firms with above average growth. Furthermore, the results presented
an important relation between financial development and firm dynamics.
This concludes the analysis of the reduced form relation between the interaction of financial
dependence and financial development with growth and R&D. The main results are summarized
below:
i) The difference in growth of firms in sectors with high financial dependence compared to those
in sectors with low financial dependence is increasing in the financial development of the country.
ii) The difference in R&D intensity of firms in sectors with high financial dependence compared
to those in sectors with low financial dependence is increasing in the financial development of the
country.
iii) The effect of financial development on firm growth and R&D intensity will affect differ-
entially firms with growth rates above average, suggesting an important relation between financial
development and firm dynamics.
1.2.3 From R&D to Growth
Any theoretical model of endogenous growth would emphasize the relation from R&D to growth
both at the aggregate level and at the firm level. That is why a natural reading from the predictions
above is that the effect of the interaction between financial development and financial institutions
on growth could be caused by the impact this interaction has on R&D. One could proceed to
estimate a regression of the form
gijTk =01 + 0 1 +±1 -Wlk-6 1T +<plog(RD/Salei3 Tk)+1 * FDEVk * FDEP +
+P1 * ageijTk + A1 * log(SaleijTk) - eitk
and test the hypothesis that #1 = 0. This subsection tries to study precisely this hypothesis.
In particular column (1) of Table 7 shows that once we control for R&D intensity the coefficient of
the interaction term becomes negative but not significant.
The problem with estimating the above equation is that it is very likely to suffer of endogeneity,
i.e. Cov(Eitkl log(RD/Sale)) # 0. To address the potential endogeneity of log(RD/Sale) I follow
two approaches.
The first approach I follow is to instrument log(RD/Sale) with lagged values of the variable.
This approach is usually used when treating for classical measurement error. Column (2) of Table
7 shows the results for this 2SLS regression. In this case the coefficient for R&D expenditure is
positive but smaller than in column (1) and highly significant while the coefficient for the interaction
term is not significant.
As mentioned before, our measure of financial development is likely to be correlated with vari-
ables affecting a firm's growth and R&D decisions. For this reason in column (3) I instrument both
log(RD/Sale) with lagged values of R&D and financial institutions with the legal origin dummy.
The results show that the coefficient for R&D intensity is almost unchanged and remains highly
significant. The coefficient for the interaction term increases but remains non-significant.
The results above are subject to the following critique. One can argue that past R&D decision
by firms are forward looking and can be correlated with contemporaneous firm level shocks. If
this is the case, the estimated coefficients on the growth regression using lagged R&D intensity as
an instrument would be biased. To overcome this concern ideally one would like to instrument
R&D with a variable which is not affecting growth directly. One plausible source of exogenous
variation in R&D are unexpected changes in R&D tax and credits. Hall and van Reenen (2000)
provide a summary of some papers which review the tax treatment of R&D for several countries.
The problem with such literature is that most of it does not have any time variation in the tax
structure. One study which provides a unified overview of changes in R&D tax and credits is
Inn, Griffith and van Reenan (1999). In particular they construct a panel of countries over
years for which they calculate the tax component of R&D user cost. I use this measure as an
itrmient for R&D intensity. The basic assumption for the validity of the instrument is that
mages in R&D tax structure affect growth only through R&D intensity. The use of firm level
Va makes this assumption more likely to hold. The use of this instrument, however, comes at
ti ot of a much smaller sample as observations for the tax component of user cost of R&D are
b for only half the period in the sample and nine countries. With this caveat in mind I
w tie results for the estimation of the growth regression where R&D intensity is instrumented
wi changes in the tax component of the user cost of R&D. Column (4) of Table 7 shows the
A Iuts of the 2SLS regression where only R&D is instrumented while column (5) shows the case
financial development is also instrumented. We can see from both columns (4) and (5) of
i_ 7 that the coefficients for R&D intensity increase dramatically when we use tax changes as an
ajSrument and although the sample size is largely reduced this does not affect the significance of
o"f R&D. In both cases the coefficient for the interaction term becomes negative and non
n ant. One concern is that there is little variation in the financial development measure and
n when excluding R&D intensity the interaction term is non-significant for the subsample
n2ries. Column (6) in Table 7 examines this concern, The first thing to notice is that the
i.ent for the interaction term is positive as in the full sample case. The estimated coefficient
' Kr than in the full sample case but the variance is larger as was expected. Despite this, the
6fi !ent is still significant at the 10% significance level.
T main result of this subsection is summarized below:
T'e main channel through which the interaction between financial dependence and fnancial
U-fl op'nt affects a firm's growth is through the effect it has on R&D expenditure.
L3 Model
n , section I present a modified version of the model used in Akcigit (2009). I will start by
riiiig tihe basics of the model. Then I continue to define and characterize a Markov Perfect
P 221 bi rjinn (MPE) of the model. Next I turn my attention to Steady-State equilibria of the model,
eqiIflibria where aggregate variables grow at a constant rate. I conclude this section by
og ihat the model's predictions are consistent with the empirical regularities found in the
22 section.
1.3.1 Preferences and Technology
Households and Final Good Producer
I will start by describing the baseline dynamic model. Consider a discrete time economy where the
representative household maximizes the expectation of an infinite sum of discounted utility, with
intertemporal preferences of the following form,
00
Ut = E, E #7- log C, (1.3)
T~t
where Ct denotes consumption at time t, E (0, 1) is the discount factor and Et is the expec-
tation operator conditional on the information at time t. The choice of the logarithmic per-period
utility is both a widely used and convenient assumption as it implies a simple relation between the
interest rate, the growth rate and the discount factor.
Let Yt be the total production of the final good at time t. The final good is produced by a
perfectly competitive firm using inputs from two sectors, sector H and sector L Specifically the
production function for the final good takes the following form:
Y = 2Y1/2Y1/2 1.4)H L
Throughout the exposition of the model, I take the price of the final good as the numeraire and
denote the price of sector j c {H, L} at time t by Pt.
The maximization problem of the final good producer implies that the demands for input from
sector j satisfies
Yt = 
(1.5)
Ptt
Producers in sectors H and L are perfectly competitive and each uses a continuum 1 of inter-
mediates indexed by i and use the following Cobb-Douglass production function0
n Yt = In Yt di (1.6)
From sector j producer's maximization problem and denoting the price of intermediate i in
"'I could allow the set of active firms to be determined by free entry as in Akcigit (2009). This would create an
extra difficulty when trying to solve numerically the model and would introduce an extra effect of financial frictions
which, although an interesting one, I shut down.
sector j at time t by pitj, we have that the demand for intermediate i in sector j will take the
following form
Yijt =jtyjt (1.7)
Pijt
Taking (1.5) and (1.7) together we have that the demand for intermediate i in sector j follows
satisfy the following equation:
Yijt = (1.8)
Pijt
Households are endowed with 1 unit of labor which will be used for production by intermediates
and for R&D. A representative household holds a balanced portfolio of all the firms in the economy
which implies the following budget constraint
/1 .1Ct-A1  1 0 z J H0td + LHLtdi + wt + (1 + rt)At (1.9)
where H1 - are the profits of firm i at time t, wt is the wage rate in the economy at time t, rt
is the interest rate, and At are the savings of the representative consumer. Assets held by the
consumer will be used to finance R&D expenditure by firms.
Intermediate Goods Sector
Each intermediate i C I is produced by an infinitely-lived monopolist which takes decisions about
production and R&D. All these decisions will be described in detail below.
Production. Production of intermediates satisfies the following linear technology:
yijt = qijtlijt (1.10)
where lijt is the labor hired by intermediate producer i in sector j at time t and qijt E [qt, oo) is
firm-specific labor productivity with an economy-wide distribution function Et(Qt). As in Akcigit
(2009) the lower bound on the set of possible qualities, qt, reflects the fact that in each period
there is a threshold below which the technology is outdated and has no productive value. For
mathematical convenience I will assume qt > wt". Furthermore, as in Aghion and Griffith (2005),
I assume there is a competitive fringe of imitators who can produce variety i in sector j at a
marginal cost of Xwt/qt, where qt qitdEt is an aggregate labor productivity index. We can
" This assumption will guarantee that all firms earn positive profits over the labor productivity space.
interpret the term x as a measure of intellectual property rights in the economy. This assumption
implies the monopolist faces a limit price it can charge equal to Xwt/4.
The production function for intermediate i in sector j, (1.10), implies that the marginal cost of
producing intermediate i is
MWt =* (1.11)
qijt
Putting (1.8) and (1.11) together we get that "operational" profits (profits exclusive of R&D
expenditure) for an intermediate producer are
7rigt = Yt ( 1 - (Pijt sjt)- (1-12)
where ;jt - qijt/wt is firm i's relative labor productivity and will prove to be important in the
analysis that follows.
Labor Productivity and R&D Technology. So far I have treated labor productivity as a
constant. The key ingredient of the model will be investment in R&D which improves a firm's labor
productivity. In particular, each intermediate producer has a quality ladder along which she can
improve her current labor productivity, qijt, through additive step-by-step innovation. Innovation
is stochastic, such that the intermediate producer cannot choose directly future productivity, but
only the probability of success. This implies that the actual R&D decision undertaken by the
intermediate producer is the choice of a success probability which I will define as #t E [0, <
1. Putting these two assumptions together, we have that next period's labor productivity for
intermediate producer i will be given by
qijt + At with probability 4;jt
qijt+1 =
qijt with probability 1 - dijt
where At is the additive step size which is common across firms. I will assume that the step size
is proportional to the wage rate, At = AUt. This convenient normalization will turn useful when I
analyze the steady-state equilibrium of the model.
In order to generate this success probability the intermediate producer must hire labor. In
particular, I will assume that in order to have a success probability of d, hj (#, Kj) workers must be
employed. There is heterogeneity across sectors in the R&D cost function. In particular, I assume
that sectors differ in their ability to perform R&D. This ability is captured by a parameter Kj with
KH > KL. This implies that in the economy there is fraction 1/2 of firms which have ability KH and
a fraction 1/2 which have ability 'L. We can now define the distribution of labor productivity-type
pairs as
It : Qt X {I'L,{H} 
--> [0, 1
where this distribution is consistent with the distribution of intermediates within sectors and
with Et.
I assume that for a given success probability the R&D cost function satisfies the following
inequality, h(#5gt, tH) < h(igjt, "IL). This implies that sector H will be the R&D productive
sector in the economy. I will assume that firms have an infinite cost of switching sectors which
implies that they operate in the same sector as long as they live. This means that, as opposed
to labor productivity, a firm's ability will be constant over time. Going back to the empirical
section this assumption captures the observation that there is great variation in growth rates and
R&D expenditure across sectors. Furthermore, consistent with he empirical section, the described
model will imply that more financially dependent sectors in the economy will be growing faster and
investing more in R&D.
Following Kortum (1993) and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2009), I will use the following production
function for an R&D:
h(#i0t, r) = (1.13)
with 0 > 1. This specification implies that the total R&D cost for an intermediate firm is
weh(#ig, K) = #00 (1.14)
The choice of R&D by firms is not unconstrained. In particular, firms have to borrow from
households in order to invest in R&D. I assume, for example because of commitment issues, that
firms can only invest a constant p E (0, oo] of their operational profit, 7rjt . This implies the following
borrowing constraint
W Y 0 < pijt (1.15)
O/~j
This will be the key ingredient of the model in generating the relation between financial depen-
dence, financial development, growth and R&D which we observe in the data.
Exit Firms will exit whenever their labor productivity is outdated, that is when labor produc-
tivity falls below the threshold q. For simplicity I assume that an exiting firm's outside option is
the current value of the production unit.
Labor Market The intermediate producer will hire labor both for production and for R&D.
This implies that the following labor market clearing condition has to be satisfied
1 / (liHt + hHt)di + (liLt + hiLt)di (1.16)
JieH ieCIL
To close the description of the model we can summarize the timeline as follows:
" Beginning of period t, firms invest in R&D using the amount borrowed in t - 1. Current
labor productivity is qij t .
* Production of the intermediate goods, the final good, and wages paid. Profits distributed
among consumers.
" R&D outcome realized, qijt+1 determined.
" Intermediate firms borrow from households. End of period t.
1.3.2 Equilibrium
Throughout I will use Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) as the equilibrium concept, where strategies
are only functions of the payoff-relevant variables12 . For the intermediate producer the payoff-
relevant variables are the current labor productivity qijt, the firm's ability, r, as well as the distri-
bution of labor productivities, lt(Qt), the final good's production, Y, the wage rate, wt and the
interest rate.
Before characterizing the equilibrium of the model, I define an allocation as follows:
Definition 1 (Allocation) An allocation in this economy is
(i) a sequence of consumptions and Assets holdings by the households {A, Ct}to,
(ii) a sequence of productions for the final good producer {Y}i 0 , and a sequence of productions
of inputs, {Yjt }* 0 j E { H, L }
"2Using MPE allows us to ignore more ellaborate interactions between economic agents. Given the continuum
assumption it makes sense to ignore such interactions. Furthermore, the use of this equilibrium concept is generally
used for this class of models.
(iii) a sequence of productions and R&D decisions by the intermediate producers of each sector
{yjt, dyt, 15, ht=01,
where yjt = (yi -t)iE01 -e j  E011%4[%, y hg)wheret Yjti (tiit)0Co1l , jt= (1- t)-,C0ol] h~ ( ijt)iG[ol
(iv) a sequence of prices {wt, rt, Put, PLt, PHt, PLt} where pjt= (Piit)iC[0,1],JE{L,H}
(v) and a sequence of labor productivity Distributions {Ft}JUt 0
Next, I define an equilibrium in this economy. As I mentioned above, we are going to restrict
to markovian strategies. For the intermediate producers this implies that R&D decisions, prices
and production can be represented by the following mappings:
<pjt : Qt x r x F x R 3 [, j
yijt : Qt x n x F x R3- R+
piyt :Qt x r, x F x Ri 3 R+
where Qt is the space of possible labor productivities at time t, F is the space of distribution
functions and R3 stands for aggregate output, Yt, the wage rate, wt, and the interest rate, rt.
Taking these elements into account I have the following equilibrium definition:
Definition 2 (Equilibrium) A Markov Perfect Equilibrium is given by an allocation
{Y, Y , Yr, C* A*, w*, r*, y, yit, # * it, ht, pIa, p* P* P* ][I*}O such that
i) {y* p; } solves the intermediate producer's maximization problem conditional on {qt, Y*, w*, r* IF*P}
(ii) {&b*}o solves the R&D maximization problem conditional on {qiYt*,w*,r*, p*}c >
(iii) {lt, ht} O satisfy (1.10) and (1.13) respectively,
(iv) {C*, A* 1 } 0 solves the household's maximization of (1.3) subject to (1.9),
(v) {Y*}0 0 is consistent with (2.1),
(vi) {w*}t clears the labor market, {rt} 0 clears the savings market,
and
(viii) { F*}'=0 is consistent with { p* } .
ix) {Y*} is consistent with (1.6),
Having defined an equilibrium in this economy I proceed to characterize the equilibrium.
Intermediate Producers I start by pointing out that the intermediate producers' problem
can be split into two: an intratemproal problem and the R&D (intertemporal) problem. The
intratemporal problem of intermediate producer i is the static profit maximization of (1.12). We
can see from (1.12) that the profits of a monopolist are increasing in pij- which implies that the
optimal price the monopolist will charge is the limit price Xwt/4H. Using the previous observation
we have the following optimal quantities, prices and labor demands
y*t (qi; w*, Y*) = 4t(1.17)
x
yt*X
pig' (qig ; w, ,Y*) =(1.18 )qt
l2*.t (qij; wY*) (1.19)wtXqijt
where, as defined above, qig qi3 /w* and q = T/w*. Putting (1.17) and (1.18) together with
(1.12) we have that firm i's "operational" profits are
7TrJt(qzig; ew*, Y*) = Y* 1 - (1.20)
- i Xqijt
Notice that equilibrium operational profits of firm i are concave in the relative labor productivity.
Next we turn to the R&D problem faced by firm i. We can write this intertemporal problem
in recursive form and define the value of firm i, in sector j, at time t as follows:
Vig. (qigt, Kj ; Kt*) =max Ugg+ ~ 3.~ (ljt + ,K*,+(1.21)
ep 1 + rt+1 +(1 - #)V+g+1(qigj ; Kt*+1)
subject to (1.15)
where
U1114 =,g(qig ;wt, Y) - (1 + r*) wt*h(#, r,)
are the profits obtained by firm i and K* is the set of state variables at time t. Per-period
r ofi5s have two components. First we have the equilibrium operational profits. The second term
I tl-e R&D cost of the firm which is paid back to lenders. The value function presented in (1.21)
iTures the basic R&D problem of firm i. On the one hand the firm incurs in a cost in the
urreit period and on the other hand this R&D investment allows the firm to have a higher labor
oductivity in the future. The optimal R&D choice by firm i satisfies (1.21).
Having described the problem of the intermediate producer I turn to the equilibrium in the final
Jnd market.
Final Good First, using the intermediate demands we can check that the zero profit condition
finali good producer is immediately satisfied.
Also, by combining the production function of the final good producer (2.1) and (1.17) I can
own tW average relative labor productivity in the economy as
qt = x (1.22)
The eqilibrium average relative labor productivity implies that the equilibrium wage rate of
onomy will be wt =i t/X which points at the importance of average labor productivity as the
I force of growth in this economy.
Housueholds Households maximize (1.3) subject to (1.9), which gives the standard Euler
(1 + r*) (1.23)
CtL
for he law of motion of consumption. We also have that the budget constraint of the repre-
utve household will be binding in equilibrium. Combining the binding budget constraint of
amoners together with the final good producer's zero profit condition and the market clearing
mdi tio for the asset market we get the following resource constraint:
Ct* + A* I - w*Ht' = Yt*
e H E h Htdi+E h* di is aggregate employment in R&D. This condition implies
mtput and last period's assets can be used for two purposes, consumption and saving.
Labor Market Combining the labor market equilibrium condition, (1.16), and (1.22) we can
pin down equilibrium output in the economy as
(1- H)
Yt* =wt
For future reference I will define relative wage, the ratio of the wage rate with respect to output,
as
Wt = ((1.24)
(1 - Ht*) (I)
My next goal is to solve for the steady state equilibrium of the economy. The focus on the steady
state equilibrium is both for convenience and it's importance. The importance of understanding
the steady-state behavior of the model is that it allows me to predict and understand the long run
behavior of the economy.
1.3.3 Steady-State
I define a steady-state equilibrium as an equilibrium in which output, consumption, average labor
productivity and the wage rate grow at a constant rate g. Before going to the formal definition of
a steady state equilibrium, I will define a convenient normalization. In particular the normalized
value of some variable xt with respect to Y will be denoted by z.
Definition 3 (Steady-State Equilibrium) A steady state equilibrium is a tuple (V*, #*,I*, i*, g*)
such that
i) V* satisfies (1.21)
ii) @* solves (1.21)
iii) F* forms an invariant distribution over the state space Q x {iH, KL} and this invariant
distribution is generated by #*
iv) the relative wage rate, ih*, clears the labor market
and
V) C* Y* w*, 4* all grow at the constant growth rate g* which is consistent with the equilibrium
R&D decision $*.
Value Functions and Policy Functions
In what follows I will characterize the steady state equilibrium and show that the predictions of the
model are consistent with the empirical predictions from Section 2. The first thing to notice is that
in the steady-state equilibrium the only relevant state variables from an intermediate's perspective
are the relative wage rate, the growth rate, the firm's relative labor productivity and the firm's
R&D ability, r. This reduction in the space of state variables occurs because conditional on these
three variables firms can fully predict current and future prices along the equilibrium path. Having
made this observation I can write the R&D problem of the firm as
V(q, r; w, g) = max ( 0 (1.25)
oe_0 + JV 9 ,g 1-# V (9 g
where E(q) ={# E [0, #] :i h(#, K) <1 (1 - is the relevant constraint set and V is the
normalized value function. Given the stationarity of the problem, I have dropped the time indices.
The above equation uses the Euler equation to pin down the equilibrium interest rate, r* = (19)
One interesting observation which can be made from (1.25) are the externalities that aggregate R&D
will create on individual firms. In particular, higher aggregate R&D investment will have opposing
forces on individual R&D. On the one hand, it will increase the cost of R&D by increasing both
the interest rate and the wage rate. On the other hand, the growth of the wage rate depreciates
future relative labor productivity, giving an incentive to firms to overcome this through R&D.
The next proposition describes the general properties of (1.25). The proof of this proposition
and the proofs for other results in the rest of the paper can be found in the appendix at the end.
Proposition 4 For any given tuple *, i*, g*), the relative value function (1.25) exists, is unique,
continuous, strictly increasing in the relative labor productivity, differentiable and strictly concave.
This implies that optimal policy functions #* exist and they are continuous functions.
Next I proceed to characterize in more detail the R&D decision by firms. Understanding a
firm's R&D choices is crucial for understanding the forces which affect individual and aggregate
growth. I'll start by focusing on the unrestricted choice of a firm with labor productivity q and
ability r. Using the results from Proposition 4 (concavity and differentiability of the value function)
we can characterize the R&D decision of an unconstrained firm by using the first order conditions.
This implies that the unconstrained optimal choice of R&D will be:
,K; i7, g) -K ( ,6 ) 1/W1
#"U(q, K) = (#2 (K,3 - _ - (I+)9))(1.26)
- yii(1±+g)
First, as will be proven later, 4" is increasing in rH. We can also see that as idiosyncratic labor
productivity increases firms will choose a lower R&D probability. This comes from the concavity
of the value function: as a firm's labor productivity increases the differential gain of increasing
labor productivity by A will be smaller.
The effect of the growth rate on the unconstrained choice is not an obvious one. First notice
that an increase in the growth rate increases the cost of R&D through the interest rate. On the
other hand the growth rate will shrink relative labor productivity tomorrow making the differential
gain of successful R&D greater.
The unconstrained R&D choice will not be attainable for constrained firms. In particular we
will have a threshold value such that firms with q high enough will not be restricted. We summarize
this in the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 For each r there will be a threshold q(K) such that for q > 4(K) we have $*(q, K)
p" (q, K) and for q < q(K) we have #*(q, ) =$r (, K), where
# (q, ) = 1D - - (1.27)
-w q
Furthermore, (KL) < q(KH)
Lemma 5 tells us that R&D choices of a firm will be hump-shaped in q. In particular, for
q < 4(,) optimal R&D will be increasing and concave in q while for q > (K) it will be decreasing.
It also points at one important feature of the model, the set of q7s for which firms in the high ability
sector are constrained is larger than that of the low R&D ability sector. This follows from the fact
that the high ability firm is spending more on R&D than the low ability firm for a given value of q.
Existence of a Steady-State Equilibrium
In what follows I will show that a Steady State equilibrium exists. First I start by characterizing
the equilibrium growth rate for a given F*. In equilibrium we have that
q* = J id*
is constant and equal to x. Using this observation we have that the aggregate growth rate of
the economy satisfies the following equation
9 = (1.28)
X
Next I show the existence of a steady state distribution. One useful observation is that for a
given ,, there exists a # A/g* such that for a given g* > 0, if i > 4 then t±T < 4 for some finite
T > 0. This implies that all states q > 4 are transient.
Proposition 6 Assume g* > 0. Then for a equilibrium policy functionq* (q, K) there exists a
unique Steady-State Distribution F* Q x { KL, KH - (0, 11
To finish the characterization of a Steady-State Equilibrium the following proposition shows
that a steady-state equilibrium with a positive growth rate g* exists.
Proposition 7 Consider the economy above. A Steady-State Equilibrium m* = (V*, @*, i *, g*
exists. Furthermore, g* > 0.
Financial Dependence and Financial Development
Next I will analyze what is the effect of sectoral differences on R&D ability, K, and financial
development, p, on a firms's decisions. One question that comes naturally from the analysis above
is whether higher ability firms, firms in sector H, are choosing higher R&D levels conditional on
their size. The next lemma shows that this is the case.
Lemma 8 The policy function, @*, is increasing in x for a given value of q
Having characterized the policy function we turn to the analysis of three variables of interest
at the firm level: expected growth, R&D intensity and financial dependence. The study of these
variables will be important when trying to map the model to the observed patterns in the data.
As the reader can expect, the results I will show for these three variables of interest will be closely
related to the results for R&D probabilities, #it.
I will start by defining a firm's growth in labor productivity as
A#$*(, x) - g
(q, A) = (1.29)(1 + g*)
From this equation we can see that a firm's growth is determined by three factors. On the
one hand a firm's growth is affected by her current labor productivity. As pointed above, the
effect of labor productivity on growth will be hump-shaped. At low levels of labor productivity
the firm will be financially constrained and increases in labor productivity will relax the constraint.
This channel will allow firms to invest more in R&D and grow faster. On the other hand, as
the firm's constraint is slack, R&D is decreasing in labor productivity, which then causes growth
to slow down. The second channel is aggregate growth. On the one hand growth has a direct
negative effect on individual growth as it depreciates future sales. On the other hand there is an
indirect effect through R&D decisions which is ambiguous. The third channel is the firm's R&D
ability. Finally Lemma 6 implies that for a given labor productivity level, j, individual growth
will be weakly increasing in r.
Next we define R&D intensity (R&D expenditure divided by operational profits) as
1+ g>[yR(q, j = (1.30)
6K1#(q - 1)
Similarly we will define a firm's financial dependence (borrowing over profits) as
4@o* (q^, r)"
OK(q- 1)
It is obvious from these definitions that in this model financial dependence and R&D intensity
are proportional.
One key question in the analysis is how financial dependence is related to a R&D ability. To
answer this I will characterize how R&D intensity varies as we vary the firm's R&D ability.
Lemma 9 For a given relative labor productivity q, R&D intensity and Financial Dependence,
R( I, i) and F(q, r,) respectively, are weakly increasing in K.
This result implies that R&D ability and financial dependence are tied together. In particu-
we have that firms operating in sector H will have higher financial dependence. So far, and
mnsistent with the data, the model suggests that sectors which have higher r are more financial
endent, grow faster and invest more in R&D. But the empirical section also suggests a differ-
I effect of financial development on the growth rate and R&D investment of firms in sector H
pared to those in sector L.
Scial Equilibrium Analysis So far I have shown that firms with higher R&D ability have
he ~ growth, higher R&D choices and higher financial dependence. But one natural question one
can ask is how are these variables affected by the measure of financial development of the economy,
Answering this question is difficult due to the general equilibrium effect that M has on prices and
m's value function. Because of this I will split the analysis into two. First I will characterize
effects of M on the variables of interest assuming that the Value functions, the wage rate and
owth rate are constant while the general equilibrium effect will be analyzed in detail in the
<ection. Studying this partial equilibrium case will be useful in highlighting the main channel
gh which financial development and a firm's ability interact. Two important results emerge
m s partial equilibrium analysis. The first result shows how financial development shapes the
firms which are financially constrained. Second, as a consequence of the effect of financial
ment in the set of constrained firms and holding the g*,i!* and V* fixed, an increase in M
I bigger impact in the R&D investment of those firms with higher R&D ability, sector
fe next Lemma shows the main results of the partial equilibrium analysis. I show first that
veni g* and j * higher financial development increases both R&D intensity and growth of a
I aFJd second that this higher financial development increases also the differential growth and
J m isity between a high ability and a low ability firm.
ooan tO For given relative labor productivity q, and constant V*, g* and i*,
n growth and R&D intensity, 5, rz), are weakly increasing in M.
) !8U/ thermore we will have that for MH > IL, the following conditions must hold
R(, KH; LH) KH; -L)
R( , KL ; 11H) R(,Li IL)
g(,KH ; LH) KH ; YL)
GCKL ; YjH KL; -,L)
3) The inequalities are non monotonic in q.
The result follows form the fact that high types will be more severely affected by low levels of
financial development as they are the ones who are spending more on R&D. This result is consistent
with the findings in Section 2 and points to a particular channel as a possible explanation of how
financial development affects firm growth and aggregate growth: low levels of financial development
affect disproportionately firms which have a higher R&D ability as opposed to those that don't.
One should beware as the results I find stem from one important modeling assumption. In
particular I have assumed that the borrowing limit is subject only to current profits which are
independent of ability. A more general framework would allow this borrowing constraint to depend
on a firm's value. This would end up favoring high ability types who will have higher value
functions. However, the total effect is ambiguous as high types are still investing more on R&D
which makes the financial constraint more likely to be binding. The choice of this simpler constraint
is a matter of tractability of the model".
So far I have showed that the predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical pre-
diction above. However, this predictions assume that the Value functions of the firm, the relative
wage and the growth rate are constant as y changes. Once I take this general equilibrium effect
into account, one could expect the predicted patterns to change. The next section shows that
even when we take this general equilibrium effects into account the predictions of the model remain
consistent with the predictions in the data.
1.4 Numerical Solution
1.4.1 Computational Strategy
The purpose of this section is to solve the model numerically in order to assess and quantify the
general equilibrium effects of financial development. First I start by describing the computational
strategy to be followed.
The computational solution of the model consists of the following routine. First there is an
outer layer which consists of two variables, namely the aggregate growth rate g* and the labor share,
in this outer layer I use a bracketing procedure in order to find the equilibrium prices. Next, taking
"3l solved the model numerically with the different R&D restriction. For high levels of t convergence was achieved
and the main predictions remain unchanged. The computational challenge arose for low values of p in which case I
didn't get convergence of the value functions.
rhs values as given inside the inner nest, a firm's value function is solved using a value function
iteration routine. For this, I calculate the unconstrained policy and evaluate if the constraint
is sack. If it is, then this is the policy function #* = otherwise we calculate the restricted
duc using (1.27) , #* =OR. Since the state space Q is continuous I use a cubic splines collocation
method to approximate the value function at exactly n = 150 points.
Once the value function iteration converges I use the policy function #* to calculate a transition
unction and with this a Steady-State Distribution over the n points. With this distribution I
,niulate the growth rate and the relative wage rate using (1.28) and (1.24) respectively. These
s are compared to the original guess and we increase or decrease the new guesses depending
n the sign of the difference between the old guess and the predicted values.
I have 7 parameters in the model and their values are taken from several studies. First, the
vahe for 0 is set to two which is within the range of values suggested in Kortum (1993). The
alue( of the innovation step size, A, is taken from Akcigit and set to 0.25. I use a value for the
Int factor, 0, of 0.975 which is consistent with values used in the literature. The value for x
- jms to be 2 which implies a mark-up of a 100%. This mark-up value is consistent with the
mat; by Hall (1988) and Broda and Weinstein (2004) 14 This leaves me with 2 parameters
I 1 e low ability level KL and the constant -y which are calibrated such that the model with
no financial frictions matches the moments frorn the US Compustat firms1 5 . To do this, I use the
,2005 period and divide firms into two groups, low financial dependence and high financial
iiudevnce. In particular I calculate the 33rd percentile and 66th percentile of the distribution
ohe financial dependence measure calculated in Section 2. Using these thresholds I define a high
-i dependence sector as a sector with financial dependence above the 66th percentile and
ly a low financial sector a sector with financial dependence below the 33rd percentile.
smg this classification of sectors, I calculate three statistics from the sample:
ho w difference in average growth between the high financial dependence sector and the low
Smmcial dependence sector,
11-h difference in average R&D intensity between the high financial dependence sector and the
lIow financial dependence sector,
1i parwular, Hall (1988) estimates mark-ups for US industries which are bigger than the one I use. On the other
IOlt Broda and Weinstein (2004) estimate elasticities of substituion using trade data and the implied mark-ups from
h , uid are smaller than the one I use. I have chosen a value consistent with both these studies.
T pvameter Is is normalized to 1.
* the difference in average labor productivity between the high financial dependence sector and
the low financial dependence sector
The next table shows the results obtained from the calibration exercise
9H-9L RDH-RDL qH-qL
Data 0.012 0.08 0.06
Model 0.011 0.06 0.08
1.4.2 Value Function, R&D, and ft
Before analyzing the effect of p on aggregate growth, the equilibrium wage rate and welfare, I
start by analyzing the effect that changes in p has on the Value functions and the policy functions.
Section 3 showed that if we treated the growth rate, the wage rate and the value functions as
constant and for a given labor productivity level, differences in R&D intensity and growth rates
between firms of high and low R&D ability are increasing in p. Next, I will present the calibration
results for the economy with p = o and one with p = 0.6. Figures 5 and 6 show that the partial
effect of p might not hold once we allow for this general equilibrium interactions. First notice
that policy functions satisfy the properties highlighted above. For the economy with financial
constraints, R&D is always decreasing in labor productivity and the high ability invests more for
every labor productivity value. Similarly, for the constrained case we have a hump-shaped best
response as predicted in the theory. One important observation to be made is that when we have
financial frictions the value function becomes very steep for firms which are financially constrained.
This could create a region in which differences in R&D choices by high and low ability firms might
be larger in the constrained case than in the unconstrained. Despite this possibility, the analysis
that follows shows that on average the "partial effect" result from Section 3 still holds
1.4.3 Aggregate Results and Financial Development
To analyze the effect of differences in financial dependence I have solved the general equilibrium
model for different values of p. I will start analyzing the results by showing the effect of financial
development on growth. Figure 7 shows the plot of the equilibrium growth rate for various values
of pt. The dashed line is the growth rate of an economy with no financial friction (p = 00). The
first thing to notice is that growth and financial dependence are positively correlated and the gains
in growth from increases in financial development are particularly big for low levels of financial
development. This result is consistent with the evidence presented in Figure 2, where the same
pattern emerges. Figure 8 presents a similar pattern for the equilibrium wage rate in the economy.
The co-movement of the wage rate and the measure of financial development comes from the fact
that when p is higher firms are investing more in R&D which requires them to hire more labor,
pushing up the labor demand.
Figures 9 and 10 present the second successful prediction of the model. Both the expected
difference in firm growth and R&D intensity between firms in sector H and sector L (high financial
dependence and low financial dependence, respectively) are increasing in financial development.
This goes in line with the empirical section which showed evidence of a positive effect of the
interaction between financial dependence and financial development on growth and R&D intensity.
The next goal is to assess the welfare gains of higher financial development. From (1.3) and
the final good market clearing condition, we can approximate aggregate welfare for an economy
with financial development p as
ln(v*(p)) 3g*(p)
W (p) ~ -(+2 (.31
Figure 11 shows this relation. The pattern that emerges is exactly the one we observe for growth
and the wage rate. As with growth, this implies that there are big gains to be made from financial
development for economies with low levels of u.
The discussion above suggests that there is room for policy interventions to increase the welfare
of the economy. In particular there are three dimensions for which policy might be important in
contributing to welfare. First, as in Akcigit (2009), under no financial constraint, small firms are
doing more R&D conditional on ability which calls for subsidies for small firms. In addition to
that, firms with higher R&D are ability are contributing more to growth which suggests that they
should be targeted by policy. Finally, financial constraints are affecting R&D decisions precisely
of those firms which had a higher contribution to growth in the first place. All this suggests that
optimal R&D policy should take into account all three channels. The next Section deals with the
discussion of policy design in a world of financial frictions and heterogeneity among firms.
1.5 Policy
In the model presented in Section 3 there are three reasons for which the decentralized economy
is inefficient: First, monopoly power of intermediate producers generates a distortion in their
production. Second, because of this distortion in production the value to an intermediate producer
of improvements in labor productivity is smaller than the social value of such improvement. Third,
the presence of financial frictions implies that firms are investing in R&D less than what is socially
optimal. If we would give the policy maker the ability to use production and R&D subsidies which
are conditional on labor productivity, R&D ability and the level of financial development, then first
best allocations could be attained. In what follows I will analyze the optimal policies restricting the
analysis to a particular subset of policies, two-level size-dependent R&D subsidies. This subset of
policies will be important given the two inefficiencies mentioned above regarding R&D investment.
There are three important caveats to this analysis. First, I am not conditioning policies on
R&D ability, that is sector specific subsidies. Not considering this dimension will be crucial in the
results obtained below as firm size will also be informative of R&D ability. This restriction would
be plausible if, for example, the policy maker can observe the production level of the firm but can't
observe in which sector it operates. This would be a realistic assumption if the set of intermediates
used by the two sectors is similar. Second, I will restrict to a subset of all size-dependent subsidies.
I impose this restriction to simplify the numerical analysis which follows. Finally, as will become
clear below, subsidies will relax the financial constraint of firms. An alternative way to relax the
financial constraint of a firm would be to offer size-dependent lump-sum transfers which I am not
considering in the analysis. One reason for assuming this restriction is lack of commitment by
firms to use the transfer for R&D. This lack of commitment by firms, which may be precisely the
underlying reason for the presence of financial constraints, makes the assumed restriction plausible.
The practical importance of analyzing this set of policies arises from the growing debate over
the suboptimality of private R&D and the role for policy to align the social and private returns of
R&D investment. As a result of this debate policymakers around the world have engaged in R&D
subsidy programs to stimulate R&D investment. One important observation is that such programs
vary greatly in their intensity as well as in their shape". In particular, certain countries tend to
have special treatment for a Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) and for startups. One goal of
this section is to rationalize in the context of the model presented in Section 3 the variety of R&D
and production subsidy regimes observed in the world. One important question I will ask is how
these regimes change as the financial development of the economy varies and how the optimal mix
between R&D subsidies and production subsidies.
I study a setup in which the government provides R&D subsidies to finance a fraction ri of
"See Hall and Van Reenen (2000) for a survey of different R&D subsidy programs around the world.
1&D investment. Given the widespread use of size-dependent subsidies, I will allow the
s ides to be size-dependent which in the context of the model is equivalent to having labor
prm( luctivity dependent subsidies
= --TRDq)
T he proposed R&D subsidy regime implies that firm i will only pay (1- rfD)(1 + rt)wth (0)
nted of the full R&D cost. The government finances R&D subsidies through lump sum taxes T
wCumers. The government follows a balanced budget which implies
T = JRD (-)wth(O))dE
In what follows I will focus on Welfare-maximizing subsidy schedules, that is, schedules which
I (1.31).
Before analyzing different R&D subsidy regimes I start by presenting the results when no
A 9bsidies are in place. The following table reports the average R&D probability (0) , the
ninrnunrelative wage rate ii*, the equilibrium growth rate g* and the resulting welfare for the
A ess economy and an economy with a value of p =0.6.
Table 7. No Subsidy
* * T T Welfare
p oc 0.6106 0.0338 0.1577 0 0 13.89
p = 0.6 0.6080 0.0319 0.1503 0 0 13.19
p - 0.05 0.5810 0.0175 0.0793 0 0 7.18
\s was discussed in Section 4 a higher level of p will imply a higher growth rate and relative
as firms are investing more in R&D. This positive relation between financial development
I D ,pending can be seen more clearly when we compare the average success probability in
y, which as can be seen almost doubles when we move from an economy with p = 0.05
P frJtionless economy (p = oo). Next we turn to the analysis of R&D subsidy.
15.1 Uniform R&D Subsidy
turn to the analysis of a uniform R&D subsidy, that is, a subsidy which is independent of
1n Iaracteristic. Formally this corresponds to the case in which TRD  Vq. Under
this policy regime the model generates the following results:
Table 8. Uniform Subsidy
i * g* T RD T Welfare
y = 0 0.8156 0.0526 0.3720 0.5860 0.1766 20.19
p = 0.6 0.8126 0.0524 0.3680 0.6150 0.1839 20.14
y = 0.05 0.7598 0.0469 0.2751 0.8925 0.1885 18.12
The first thing to observe is that for any financial development level there are welfare gains to
be made by a uniform R&D subsidy. As we can see such a policy increases growth compared to
the no subsidy regime at the cost of a decrease in initial consumption through a higher wage rate.
The overall welfare effects of a uniform R&D subsidy are large specially for low levels of financial
development. The second thing to notice is that the optimal uniform R&D subsidy is decreasing
in financial development. As was discussed earlier R&D subsidies will be a useful tool to correct
the two frictions present in this model: financial frictions and monopoly power. For this reason,
as the level of financial development in the economy is smaller the optimal R&D subsidy becomes
more aggressive.
1.5.2 Size-Dependent Two-Level R&D Subsidy
As was mentioned at the beginning of this Section, many countries have differential R&D subsidies
for firms of different sizes. In the context of the model presented in this paper there are three
forces for why a policy maker would want to target subsidies based on size. First, there is a size
effect: in the absence of financial frictions and for a given R&D ability, firms with smaller labor
productivity will engage in higher R&D investment. This implies that targeting R&D subsidies to
firms of low labor productivity is a more efficient way to boost growth which is the effect present
in Akcigit (2009) Second, there is a financial constraint effect: in the presence of financial
frictions size-dependent policies have the extra benefit of targeting those firms which are financially
constrained. The third side to size-dependent policies is the composition effect: high ability firms
have in equilibrium higher labor productivity. This implies that targeting firms with high labor
productivity can be beneficial as this subsidizes indirectly high ability firms.
To analyze this channels I will consider a two-level size-dependent subsidy of the following shape
TRD { D if _q< qRD (q- RD
RD ifRTb q_
This type of policy resembles what we observe in countries such as the UK. The next table
presents the results from such a subsidy regime
Table 9. Two-Level Subsidy
RD RD T Welfare
q5 8  Tb
yZ 00 0.8052 0.0528 0.3851 0.4567 0.6538 0.2308 23.08
y = 0.6 0.8029 0.0525 0.3691 0.5671 0.6235 0.1885 22.12
= 0.05 0.7890 0.0495 0.3154 0.9115 0.7532 0.1823 19.25
Two important results emerge from the size-dependent two-level subsidy analysis. First we can
see that for all levels of financial development a size-dependent subsidy always yields higher welfare
compared to a uniform subsidy case. This result should not be surprising as the latter is a special
case of the former. This result goes in line with Acemoglu and Akcigit (2009) and Akcigit (2009)
which find that state-dependent policy is optimal in the context of endogenous growth models.
The second and most novel result is the shape of the optimal R&D subsidy. In particular we can
see that for the frictionless economy (y oo) the optimal size-dependent subsidy is decreasing in
size. This implies that the composition effect discussed above dominates the fact that smaller firms
spend more in R&D. As financial development decreases the financial constraint effect becomes
more important and the optimal R&D subsidy is decreasing in size.
1.6 Conclusion
Motivated by a large literature emphasizing the role of financial development on growth, this paper
investigates in detail the potential channels that cause this relation. The channel I emphasize is
the effect of R&D on growth and I argue that financial constraints are likely to affect long run
growth precisely through the impact they have on R&D. Although this channel seems obvious,
little empirical work has been done to explore it. The first contribution of this paper is to show
empirically that financial development affects disproportionately firms which have high financial
needs compared to those that have a low financial need. The results found are consistent with
the seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1998). I also show that there is a similar pattern when
considering the effect of financial development on R&D intensity by firms, which is consistent with
other work which has found a co-movement of growth and R&D with respect to other variables using
a similar methodology as the one I use (see for example Aghion, Hemous and Kharroubi (2009)).
These relations are shown to be robust to a number of checks. But the most important empirical
contribution is the analysis of the hypothesis that financial constraints affects firm growth through
the effect they have on R&D. In particular I show that once one controls for R&D in the growth
regression, the effect of the interaction between financial dependence and financial development on
growth disappears. This result is shown to be robust to the possible endogeneity of R&D in the
growth regression.
Second I rationalize this finding by studying a theoretical infinite horizon general equilibrium
model where firms are financially constrained in their R&D investment decisions. I assume firms
are heterogeneous in two dimensions. The first dimension of heterogeneity is that firms are different
in their labor productivity. At the heart of the model is the fact that labor productivity can be
increased through R&D. This dimension of heterogeneity is widely used in models of Schumpeterian
growth. The second dimension of heterogeneity comes from sectoral differences in the R&D
production function. The model assumes that firms operating in one sector of the economy are
more able in doing R&D and that firms can't switch sectors. The model predicts that for perfect
capital markets the firm's R&D and expected growth are decreasing in the firm's size. When
financial constraints are introduced there is a hump-shaped relation between R&D decisions and
a firm's size. Second the model predicts that, irrespective of the level of financial development
of the economy, firms with higher ability will invest more on R&D conditional on their labor
productivity. Two results that emerge from these predictions is that financial constraints will hit
harder firms with lower levels of labor productivity and higher ability. This result will be crucial
when confronting the model to the empirical prediction. The model also predicts that conditional
on size, the difference between R&D expenditure and growth between a high ability firm and a low
ability firm is increasing in financial development. I interpret this result to be consistent with the
observed empirical findings.
Then by using a numerical approach, I show that the aggregate growth rate of the economy
and the wage rate of the economy are monotonically increasing concave in financial development.
The second observation is consistent with the empirical pattern observed in Figure 1. The results
also find big welfare increases for low levels of financial development.
The model presented sheds light on the design of R&D policy. In particular it shows that there
are three dimensions which R&D policy affect. First, for a given size and financial development
level, policies which target high ability firms will attain higher welfare as these policies boost
growth at a minimum consumption cost. Second, in the absence of financial frictions and for a
given R&D ability, firms with lower labor productivity spend more on R&D. Third, there is a
financial constraint effect: in the presence of financial frictions R&D subsidies targeted to small
firms relax the financial constraint of small firms. I compare two policy regimes: a uniform subsidy
(size-independent) and size-dependent subsidy. The results of this analysis suggest large gains of
implementing R&D subsidies, in particular, size-dependent subsidies. An important result found
is the shape of such subsidies. I find that for high levels of financial development the optimal
size-dependent subsidy is increasing in size since firms with higher R&D ability have in equilibrium
higher labor productivity values. As financial development decreases the financial constraint effect
dominates and the optimal size-dependent R&D subsidy becomes decreasing in size.
1.7 References
" Acemoglu, Daron and Akcigit, Ufuk (2009) "State Dependent Intellectual Property
Rights Policy" MIT mimeo
" Acemoglu, Daron and Simon Robinson (2005) "Unbundling Institutions" Journal of
Political Economy, Vol 113, No.5, pp. 949-995.
" Aghion, Philippe, George-Marios Angeletos, Abhijit Banerjee and Kalina Manova
(forthcoming) "Volatility and Growth: Credit Constraints and the Composition of Invest-
ment" Journal of Monetary Economics
" Aghion, Phillipe, David Hemous, and Enisse Kharroubi (2009) "Credit Constraints,
Cyclical Fiscal Policy and Industry Growth" Harvard mimeo
" Aghion, Phillipe, Peter Howitt and David Mayer-Foulkes (2005) "The Effect of
Financial Development on Converge: Theory and Evidence" Quarterly Journal of Economics,
vol. 120, pp. 173-222.
" Akcigit, Ufuk (2009) "Firm Size, Innovation Dynamic and Growth" University of Penn-
sylvania manuscript
" Baker, Malcolm and Jeffrey Wurgler (2002) "Market Timing and Capital Structure"
The Journal of Finance, Vol. LVII, No.1
" Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Ross Levine (2001) "The Financial Struc-
ture Database." In Financial Structure and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison
of Banks, Markets, and Development. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
" Beck, Torsten, Ross Levine and Norman Loayza (2000) "Financial Intermediation
and Growth: Causality and Causes" Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 46, pp. 31-77
" Bencivenga, Valerie and Bruce Smith (1991) "Financial Intermediation and Endoge-
nous Growth" The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, pp. 195-209
" Bloom, N., Griffith, R. and Van Reenen, J. (1998) "Do R&D tax credits work? Evi-
dence from an International Panel of countries 1979-1994" Institute of fiscal Studies Working
Paper W99/8
" Broda, Christian and David Weinstein (2004) "Variety Growth and World Welfare"
The American Economic Review, Vol.94, No.2, pp 139-144
" De Gregorio, Jose and Pablo Guidotti (1995) "Financial Development and Economic
Growth" World Development, Vol. 23, pp. 433-448
" Demirguc-Kunt, A. and V. Maksimivic (1998) "Law, Finance and Firm Growth",
Journal of Finance, 53, pp. 2107-2137
* Fama, Eugene and Kenneth French (2002) "Testing Tradeoff and Pecking Order Pre-
dictions about Dividends and Debt" Review of Financial Studies 15 pp. 1-37
" Glaeser, Edward L., and Andrei Shleifer (2002) "Legal Origins" Quarterly journal of
Econmics vol. 117, pp. 1193-1229
" Greenwood, Jeremy and Boyan Jovanovic (1990) "Financial Development, Growth
and the Distribution of Income", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98 pp. 1076-1107
" Guner, Nezih, Gustavo Ventura and Yi Xu (2008) "Macroeconomic Implications of
Size-Dependent Policies" Review of Economic Dynamics, Vol. 11, pp. 721-744
" Hall, Bronwyn and John Van Reenen(2000) "How effective are fiscal incentives for
R&D? A review of the evidence." Research Policy, 29 (4-5) pp. 449-469. ISSN 0048-7333
" Hall, Robert (1988) "The Relation between Price and Marginal Cost in U.S. Industry"
The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, pp. 921-947
" King, Robert and Ross Levine (1993) "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might be
Right" The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, pp. 717-737
" La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and R. Vishny
(1998) "Law and Finance" Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), pp. 113-155.
" Laeven, Luc, Ross Levine and Stelios Michalopoulos (2009) "Financial Innovation
and Endogenous Growth" mimeo.
" Levine, Ross (2003) "Finance and Growth: Theory, Evidence and Mechanisms" Handbook
of Economic Growth edited by Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf.
" Kortum, Samuel (1993) "Equilibrium R&D and the Patent-R&D Ratio: US Evidence,"
American Economic Review, 83, pp. 450-457
* Raddatz, Claudio (2006) "Liquidity Needs and Vulnerability to Financial Underdevelop-
ment" Journal of Financial Economics, 80, pp. 667-772
" Rajan, Raghuram and Luigi Zingales (1998) "Financial Dependence and Growth" The
American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No.3, pp-559-586
* Restuccia, Diego and Richard Rogerson (2007) "Policy Distortions and Aggregate
Prodicutivity with Heterogeneous Plants" NBER Working Paper No. 13018
" Saint-Paul, Gilles (1992) "Technological Choice, Financial Markets and Economic Devel-
opment" European Economic Review, Vol. 36, pp. 763-781
" Stokey, Nancy and Robert Lucas (1989) "Recursive Methods in Economic Dynamics"
Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
* United Nations, Statistical Division. Industrial Statistical Yearbook, Vol.1. New York:
United Nations, 2001.
1.8 Appendix 1: Proofs
Proof of Proposition (4)
To prove this Proposition we will check the assumptions in Stokey-Lucas (1989). Through this
proof I will assume that K is a continuous variables with K E [Kmin, Kmax]-
Assumption 9.4 S-L First notice that the relevant state space is Q* [q, qmax), where
qmax = A/g < 00. The logic for this upper bound on relative labor productivities comes from the
fact that values above this upper bound will be depreciated by the growth rate even in the case of
a successful shock. Therefore labor productivities will always lie in Q, which is clearly a Borel set
in R.
Assumption 9.5 S-L As shown in Akcigit (2009) the set Z [0, # is a compact Borel set in
R and the transition function { if q =1+g
0 otherwise
satisfies the Feller property.
Assumption 9.6 S-L Take the set
{- [0 1 - 1 /O}
R, r) = #E 0, :< ~17 -
It is clear that for any ( , r) the set is non-empty. Compactness comes from the fact that for
every (q, r) the set is closed and is bounded. Continuity follows from the fact that p (1
is continuous in q, n.
Assumption 9.7 S-L We now turn to the question of compactness of the profit function
(1+ g) - 0This function is clearly bounded below in H x Q by ( 9 V 0 and is bounded above by 1.
Given this, the existence and uniqueness of the value function follows from theorem 9.6 in
Stokey-Lucas (1989).
Assumption 9.8 S-L The profit function H (1 - is increasing in and
, for all values of #.
Assumption 9.9 S-L Take q7 > , ' > ,. Then we have
p ~. 1 - > p/-1 -
-Yw- q -Yw q
(a 1 6- 1
this implies that E(q, K) 9 E(i7, K) and 7(q K) G E(q K').
This proves that the value function is increasing in both relative labor productivity, q, and R&D
ability, K.
Assumption 9.10 S-L The profit function is concave in both q, #. Furthermore, if 0 > 2 the
profit function is jointly concave in .q, #, r4.
Assumption 9.11 S-L The function (p0 (1 - 9 is concave in ,K.This implies that
the set E is convex in q,s.
Assumption 9.12 S-LThe profit function is continuously differentiable on the interior of Q x B.
Putting this last observations, and by virtue of Theorems 9.9 and 9.10 in Stokey-Lucas (1989)
we have that the Value function is strictly concave and differentiable in q.
Proof of Lemma (5)
Define
g,o x ~ (^ h(# (q, ) , r,)
1 1 ( )21(4,K) 0/(0-1)
4 6 TwP +g)
where AV (_, ) = r -
First using Proposition 4 we know that V is continuous in q which implies that r(, K) is
continuous. Second, because of the concavity of V we have that AV (q, K) is decreasing in %. This
implies that g(q, K) is increasing in q. Finally, and using the fact that V is strictly increasing, we
have that g(1, K) < 0 and limi_,oo g(q, K) > 0. All this implies that there exists a unique q(K) E
R+ which satisfies
1 1 (K1/O) ' 2 AV(7(K) /OI)/(0-1) (1.32)
qWO 8 7m (1 + g)
Now we want to analyze how KAV (4(K), &)0 changes as , changes. Notice that if AV (4, K)
is increasing in K we will have -q(KH) > 4(nL). Now suppose AV (-, K) is decreasing in r. In this
case we need to determine if
KH(A~ KH,)) > KL (AV Kj (1.33)
Using the fact that V (-, K) is increasing in r implies that condition (1.33) is satisfied and
4(KH ) > -q(KL)-
Proof of Proposition (6)
First of all, for a given n, #* is continuous and bounded on Q. Furthermore I assumed that
# < # < 1. This implies that 3n* < oo such that for every q we have
q 0
Then conditional on K,for any q'EQ
P"* (, 0)(1 - )"* > c > 0
Since for all A C 2Q, either 0 E A or 0 A, we have
P"* (, A) > Pn* (q, 0) > E> 0
or
Pn* (q, AC) > P4* (, 0) ; c> 0
This is condition M in chapter 11 of Stokey-Lucas (1989).
This proves the existence and uniqueness of a conditional steady-state distribution IQ*(q]).
This implies the Steady-State Distribution i7* (q, K) exists, is unique and satisfies:
l'* ( , K) = Pr(K) T*(jq^K)
where
Pr(K) { P if KH
1 -- p otherwise
Proof of Proposition (7)
The proof follows directly from Akcigit (2009).
Proof of Lemma (8)
As shown in Lemma 5 we have q(KH) > q(KL). This implies that we can divide the analysis in
three region
i) for q < (rL) we have
which is increasing in K.
ii) For i;> 4(KH) we have
Yiwv(1 + g)
which as shown in Lemma 6 is increasing in K.
iii) For 4(KL) < < (riH) we have a firm that a firm with KH is restricted and a firm with KL
is unrestricted. This implies that R&D intensity of firm KH will be
#*(,H) = 0'(q KH) > or qKL)
Since q(KL) < q we have that # (q KL) > #" (q KL) = ( KL) . Putting the two inequalities
together we have
#*(q, KIL) < #(,KH)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma (9)
As shown in Lemma 5 we have 4(KH) > 4(KL). This implies that we can divide the analysis in
three region
i) for q< q(KL) we have that R&D intensity is
p( g)
whcq, K) = f g)
which is independent of r,.
ii For > 4q(KH) we have
p(+ )(-1) 1/ -) ( -)
R(q', K) V 3o'W (0q, KH)  /01
8(q - 1) (1 I+ g)
which as shown in Lemma 6 is increasing in .
ii) For j(KL) << q (rH) we have a firm that a firm with KH is restricted and a firm with KL
stricted. This implies that R&D intensity of firm KH will be constant. Since (L) < and
i'ven K RD intensity is decreasing in q, we will have
R( , rIL) < RRf, r-H)
This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma (10)
Itart by proving part (1) of Lemma (10). Take two financial development levels, M, such that
Using condition (1.32) in Lemma 5 we have that -q(; pH) <q(K; ML). Then ,holding
and q, there are three relative regions to analyze:
(K; pH) we have
ng condition (1.27) we have that #(, K; pH) > #Kr, K; pL). This immediately implies that
g - (q, K; PL); R(q, r;i ) > R), Vi- L)
P(; pH) < q < (K; sL) the optimal R&D choices are
#(, ;L) = '(^ ;pL)
WX know that #"(q,K) is the unrestricted optimal choice for q K which implies #"(, K) >
p ). This means C(K K; pH) > K(;;L), qL ;pH > p )-
i i- Fr q > q(K; pL) firms are unrestricted and their R&D decisions are independent of M, or
(q' ;pL); (qPMH) R(q, V- IL)-
T Proofs part (1) of the Lemma
For the second part we will have the following cases:
in t< q(tL; MH)
In this case bot types are constrained for both financial development levels.
or
T (qHp _ A
This implies(H 1/
KL
which is independent of M.
ii) q(rL; PH ) < q< min{ (L; mL), 4KH; PH)}
In this case when M = ML both firms are constrained which implies
#~* (VH; L)
# KL; PL)
or (' r;ILL(,KH; PL
For MH only high ability types are constrained which implies
*q'KH; PH)
(,KL H
Notice that since q^> 4(rL; PH), we have the following inequality #' (q, nL) < 0' (q, rL; MH)
This implies
~1/O
which shows that
$5* (qpL; H)
This result immediately shows that firm growth follows the same pattern. As for R we have
[KH L)
SKL; PL)R Y KL;H)
which follows from the fact that
KH; IH)
K~,L; PH) KL; PH)
WWKL " H)
KH; [L)
,R(q, rL LA
iii) q(rH; PL) > j > max{q4(sL; PL), (H ppH)I
qH( PL)
OKL; PL)
#, ,H; PH)
q'(, r1L)
p*q H ; H) >
$(qKL ; MH)
$(q, 1H ; PL)
$(q, KL; PL)
In this case case the only restricted firms are high ability facing low financial development.
This implies
$5* ( ALHL) q KH; L)
-KL PL) KL)
K 0 H 7 PH) KH)
#*(,KL -,H) KL)
Using the fact that #" (, KH) > r(, (H HPL) we get
#* ; ( -LIT >H 0* (H KH; YL)
* KLi -H KL ; AL)
which implies the same relation growth. The pattern for RD intensity follows form the fact
that $(i, KH I PH) = RU(, KH) > Rj rJH [Q =[ KH IL -
iv) min{q(rL; ML), (KH PH) < < m f (KL 1L 4H PH
Suppose first q(KL; ML) > 4(KH; ILH). This implies that firms are constrained only for low levels
of financial development. From Lemma 6 we have that (!) 1/0 '( > 1 which impliesL AT7(;,IL)
$*~~_q (K Hi H; YL)
* (, KL PH) * ( 7, ;L)
This condition implies the same relation for growth and R&D intensity.
Now suppose q(rL; PL) < q(QH; p). This implies that high ability firms are constrained for
both high and low levels of financial development, while low ability firms are never constrained. In
this case we have
2 , rH P H , H; ML)
R,* ( L;MtH) 4*(,KL; ML)
which follows form the fact that #* (, CL; [MLH) = #* (, KL; 1-) = (, KL) and that #* (, KH; IH)
0' ( , rH , AH ) > 0' ( , KH 1 11H ) = 0* 4, KH ; AH) -
This condition implies the same relation for growth and R&D intensity.
V) q > 4(/-L; MH)
In this case bot firms are unconstrained which implies that differences in R&D are independent
of P.
The non monotonicity follows immediately from the analysis above.
This finishes the proof.
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Chapter 2
Skill-Biased Technical Change and the
Evolution of the World Income
Distribution: An Empirical Assesment
2.1 Introduction
Output per worker varies enormously across countries. To highlight this, a simple calculation shows
that income per worker in the richest country in 1980 was approximately fifty times bigger than that
of the poorest. Furthermore, disparities in output have been amplified over the course of the last
decades, with the ratio of the richest to the poorest country almost doubling in 2000 compared to
the 1980 value. This point can be illustrated more clearly with Figure 1 where we present the kernel
estimates for the distribution of output per worker relative to the US in 1980 and in 2000. Figure
1 shows a bimodal distribution for 1980 and 2000, a point made by Quah (1996) and Jones (1997),
with a shift to the left in the two modes of the 2000 distribution. This suggests that the previously
mentioned increase in the relative income gap is a phenomenom that not only occurs in the left
tail of the distribution. Numerous theories have emerged to explain this observed patterns. Some
economists have given empirical support for the neoclassical model pointing at the importance of
physical and human capital acumulation in explaining income differences (e.g. Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Marti (1995) or Young (1995)). Other authors have proposed theories
of endogenous technological change as a way to rationalize the observed income differences, a view
which has been supported by the large TFP differences across countries (see Romer (1990), Islam
(1995), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (19970 and Hall and Jones (1999) among others). MOreover,
in recent years some economists have highlighted the importance of differences in the relative
supply of skills in explaining the observed TFP differences (e.g. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and
Caselli and Coleman (2006)). Figure 2 emphasizes the previous argument. In this figure we plot the
distribution for the supply of skills relative to the supply of skills in the United States for both 1980
and 2000. This graph shows a similar pattern as the one observed for income, with the modal value
shifting to the left and an increase in the number of countries with low skill supply relative to the
United States. An influential argument connecting the evidence presented in Figures 1 and 2 was
laid by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001). More specifically, they propose a theory of Skilled-Biased
technical change with two undelying assumptions, technological advances originate in developed
countries and technology flows freely across countries1 . One important implication of this model is
that technological advances are appropriate for the skill supply from developed countries, suggesting
that differences in skill supplies across countries can account for income differences.
In this paper we argue the mechanism presented in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) is an em-
pirically relevant one. We start by presenting evidence that the model can fit the evolution of the
income distribution in the period 1980-2000 as well as predicting the observed growth rates in in-
come per capita for the same period. More precisely, we calibrate a CES production function with
Skill-Biased technical change and predict the income levels for 1990 and 2000. Following the set-up
presented in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we make two assumptions: technology is produced in
the U.S. and is used in the production process across countries. Using this assumption we calibrate
the skill-augmenting technological parameter with the observed evolution of the skill premia in the
United States. The calibration exercise shows that the predicted growth rates for 1980-2000 are
positively correlated with the observed 1980-2000 growth rates and the hypothesis that the fitted
line lies on the 45 degree line going through the origin cannot be rejected for most parameter values
and definitions of skill supply. All this shows evidence that the model can successfully capture the
1980-2000 growth experience. Furthermore the model is also successful in predicting the observed
income distribution for 1990 and 2000, specially for the lower tail of the distribution.
In order to contrast the importance of the model presented in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001)
we compare it to two alternative growth hypotheses. The first is the neoclassical benchmark where
difference in output are explained by factor differences. This comparison will allow us to contrast
'The first assumption is supported by the disproportionate percentage of innovation originating from OECD
countries observerd in the data.
the role of productivity differences generated by skill mismatches to technology with the role of
capital accumulation. The second model we calibrate is the model presented in Caselli and Coleman
(2006). As Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Caselli and Coleman (2006) also point at the importance
of skill supply in explaining productivity differences. However, contrary to Acemoglu and Zilibotti,
they assume each country chooses a different technology level to be used in the production of goods.
By comparing the Acemoglu and Zilibotti model to the Caselli and Coleman model we are able
to compare two different channels through which the supply of skills might affect productivity:
the choice of technology and the appropriateness of technology. One challenge that arises in these
comparisons is the data availability for the skill premia. To be precise, in the calibration exercise
we use the cross country data presented in Caselli and Coleman (2006) which only estimates the
skill premia for 1980. To tackle this issue we extrapolate the 1990 and 2000 values using alternative
assumptions for the evolution of the skill premia. For this reason the results presented are subject to
the validity of this assumptions. This exercise suggests that the model presented in Acemoglu and
Zilibotti outperforms the neoclassical benchmark and the Caselli and Coleman model in explaining
the data. More precisely, we show that for all parameter values used and all definitions of skills,
the Acemoglu and Zilibotti model matches better average income, variance and interquartile range
observed in the data. Furthermore this model has a better goodness of fit than the two alternative
models. One important point from this exercise is that predicted average income and goodness
of fit of the neoclassical model is very close to those of the Acemoglu and Zilibotti model, but
there are significance difference between the models in explaining volatility. This suggests that skill
mismatches are particularly important to explain the dispersion observed in the data.
The calibration exercise discussed above relies on the chosen parameter values. For this reason
we estimate a loglinear approximation of the CES production function used for the calibration of
the Acemoglu and Zilibotti model. We find that for all the alternative definitions of skills used
the estimated values for the elasticity of substituion between skilled and unskilled workers lies
in the range of values used in the calibration exercise. Furthermore we show that the 95 percent
confidence interval from the estimation is very close to those estimated in the labor literature (Katz
and Murphy (1992)).
This paper contributes to the literature explaining cross-country income differences. A number
of papers have empirically addressed the observed income differences and growth experience in the
post-war decades. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) and Young (1995) try to explain cross-country
income differences through differences in factors of production, while Islam (1995), Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999) point at the importance of TFP differences in
explaining income differences. Our paper differs from the above mentioned literature in pointing
at the empirical relevance of differences in skill supplies in explaining TFP differences. In this
sense the closest papers to ours are Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) and Caselli and Coleman (2006).
The latter differs to this paper in the channel through which skill supply affects productivity.
Furthermore Caselli and Coleman (2006) do not contrast their mechanism to alternative ones.
In this respect the approach presented here is closely related to Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001).
There are three important differences between the present paper and theirs. First we extend the
comparison across models to include the mechanism presented in Caselli and Coleman which is
an important alternative explanation for why skill supply differences are important for income
differences. Second we check the robustness of the calibration exercise by using a range of values
fro the parameters of the model and we estimate these to validate the exercise. Finally we focus
on the relevance of the model presented in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) for the evolution of the
income distribution.
This paper also highlights the role of "appropriateness" of technology in explaining cross-country
income differences. Other papers like Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) and Basu and Weil (1998) have
also arise attention to this point. One important difference is that they focus on "appropriateness"
relative to capital per worker while we investigate the the relevance of "appropriateness" with
respect to relative skill supplies.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the methodology used in the calibration
exercise and compares the predictions of the Acemoglu and Zilibotti model to the observed data.
Section 3 compares the predictions of the Acernoglu and Zilibotti model to the predictions of the
alternative models described above. Section 4 presents the estimation results and finally Section 5
concludes. All figures and tables are shown in the appendix.
2.2 Skill-Biased Technical Change and the World Income Distri-
bution
2.2.1 Skill Biased-Technical Change: An Overview
There is large evidence which shows a large increase in inequality between skill groups in the United
States. Acemoglu (2002), for example, documents the sharp increase in the college wage premium in
the U.S. in the last century, with an increase of more than a hundred percent in the period between
1950 and 1996. Surprisingly, this massive increase in the college wage premium has occurred in a
time in which the relative supply of college graduates has more than doubled. The recent consensus
is that technical change in advanced economies favors more skilled workers compared to unskilled
workers, which exacerbates inequality between these two groups. Furthermore, as Acemoglu (1998)
shows in the context of a growth model, technical change could be driven by the relative supply
of skills in the economy. To highlight this point, suppose the economy has perfectly competitive
markets and has the following production function:
Yt = Kta[-Yh(AHtHt)- + (1 - 'Yh)(ALtLt)P](1-0)/P (2.1)
where Y is output at time t, Kt is capital at time t, Ht is the number of skilled workers in the
economy at time t, Lt is the number of unskilled workers in the economy at time t, a E (0,1), p, 7h
are constants and AHt, ALt are technological parameters changing over time. This implies that the
relative wage of a skilled worker with respect to an unskilled worker is
WHt -_ h (AHt)P; (Htj 1- (2.2)
WLt 1 - Yh ( ALJ Lt
The argument made in Acemoglu (1998) emphasizes that if 0 < p < 1 and both 2 and WHt
where increasing over time, it had to be that was increasing fast enough to compensate forALt wsicesn ateog ocmest o
the increase in 1Ui. Table 3 shows the sharp increase in AHt for values of p which are consistentLtAL, auso hchaecnitn
with the empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled labor in
Katz and Murphy (1992) and Autor et. al. (1998). In particular we estimate the skill premia for
different educational cathegories in the U.S. using the CPS files and use this estimated skill premia
to solve for the value of AHt from (2.2)for different levels of p and different definitions of skilled
and unskilled workers 2 . This exercise highlights the dramatic increase in A from 1962 to 2000.
One important implication of Skill-Biased technical change is the effect it has in the cross-
country income patterns. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) (hereafter AZ) argue that most of the
R&D investment in the world is undertaken in the OECD and in particular in the United States.
In the context of the discussion above, this suggests that technological advances in the world are
mainly driven by the skills supply in the U.S. and the developed countries. If this is the case,
differences in skill supplies across countries will be crucial to understand the observed income
2 The details of the construction of Table 3 are presented in the next subsection.
disparity in the world. This point is highlighted in the model presented by AZ who assume that
skill-biased technical emerges from developed countries and is adopted by the rest of the world.
They show that this model successfully predicts both cross-industry TFP differences and cross-
country income differences. In what follows we will add to this evidence by investigating if the
AZ model can account for two important empirical characteristics: growth rate differences across
countries and the observed evolution of the income distribution discussed in the introduction.
2.2.2 A Simple Calibration Exercise
The objective of this section is to compare the predictions of the AZ model to the data. For this
purpose we present the results of a calibration exercise using an extended version of the production
function in (2.1). In particular we calibrate the following production function
Yit =Blk h y A) hit )+ (1 - yyh)iLtp (1-3)
where Bi is a country specific effect, At is a skill neutral technological parameter, Wit is the
predicted output per worker at time t in country i, kit is capital per worker at time t in country
1, hit is the share of skilled workers in country i at time t, lit is the share of unskilled workers in
country i at time t, o E (0, 1), p = (o- - 1)/o- where u is the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled workers, _Yh is a constant and (Am/ALt)US is a skill-augmenting technological
parameters in the U.S. at time t.
Data and Methodology
We use data for yit, kit, hit and lit. The measure for y, which we will compare against the calibrated
value #, is output per worker in international dollars (i.e. PPP adjusted) and is obtained directly
from Summers, Heston and Aten (2002). Real per-worker capital stock, k, is constructed using the
method of perpetual inventory described in Hall and Jones (1999). For this we use the series of
investment per worker in international dollars from Summers, Heston and Aten (2002). Crucial to
our analysis is the construction of relative skills for each country. We use the data set constructed in
Barro and Lee (2001) to construct our measure of hit and lit. In this data set we have information
on the percentage of the population with age 25 or more who fall in one of seven cathegories.
Following Acemoglu (2002) I use three different measures of skills. The first one (Some College)
defines a skilled worker as all high school graduates with some college education. This implies
that hit will be constructed summing the last two bins in the Barro and Lee (2001) dataset. The
second classification (College Graduates) defines a skilled worker as all those who have college
education. This implies that hit will be constructed summing the last bin in the Barro and Lee
(2001) dataset. Finally, the third classification (College Equivalents) defines a skilled worker as
ht =college graduates+ (0.5*some college).
The values for az and p are taken from the literature. In particular the value of a is set to
1/3, which roughly matches the historical average of the capital share in the U.S. economy. In
the exercise we use three different values for p : 0.1667,0.2856 and 0.41173. These values lie in the
interval estimated by Katz and Murphy (1992) and Autor et.al. (1998) who argue that plausible
values for p satisfy p E (0, 1/2).
The parameters TYh and (AHt )us are constructed as follows. We compute the three cathegoriesiALt/
of skills described above using the March CPS for 1962, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. With the CPS
data we estimate the following equation:
In w1 t ='tXjt + ujt
where Xjt includes experience up to the quartic power, a female dummy, a non-white dummy, a
dummy for having some college, a college dummy and a dummy for having a post-graduate degree.
We allow the coefficient on the covariates to change through time to capture changes in the labor
market across decades. More specifically, we perform a year by year regression and use the dummy
variables for the different educational attainment groups to estimate the skill premia 4 . We set
A L1962 =1 such that
A L1962)U
h Ij 19 6 2  Hus,1962
1 - u 9 6 2 \ Lus,1962 /
and the values (Ht)us are recovered using the relative wage equation (2.2)5.
Finally the two last parameters to be obtained are Bi and At. The value of Bi for the U.S. is
set one and the parameter At is set such that #us,t = yus,t for every t. For countries other than the
U.S. I set the value of Bi such that the predicted value output per worker matches the observed
3If we define p = (a - 1)/a, where a captures the elasticity of substituion between skills, these values correspond
to o C {1.2, 1.4, 1.7}
I The estimation results are presented in Table 1.
'The values of ( u-Ls are presented in Table 3. The calibrated changes in ( s are consistent with those
found in Acemoglu (2002).
value in 1980, i.e. i,198o = yi,19so.
Results
We begin by presenting the relation between the observed growth rates and the growth rates
predicted by the AZ model. This relation can be seen graphically in Figure 3 which highlights the
positive correlation between predicted growth rates and the observed growth rates6 . In particular,
we present the scatter plot and the fitted line for two samples. The first sample is the full sample of
countries for which there is information on the capital stock, output per worker and skills for both
1980 and 2000. The second sample is the subset of the first sample for which Caselli and Coleman
(2006) report relative wages which will be used in the next section when we compare alternative
models. The positive correlation presented in Figure 1 can be explored further by running the
following growth regression:
In Yi,2000 - In Yi,1980= o' -- 3(ln Yi,2000 - ln Yi,1980) + Ei
where is predicted output per worker and y is observed output per worker. We present the
results of this regression in Table 3, where Panel A presents the full sample, Panel B presents the
Caselli and Coleman (2006) subsample and each column represents a pair of skill definition and
value for the elasticity of substitution (o). Table 3 shows that the positive correlation between
observed and predicted growth observed in Figure 1 is significant for all samples and for the all
combinations of elasticity of substitution and skill definition. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient
for # is close to land in for all nine cases in the two subsamples a coefficient of 1 lies in the 95
percent confidence interval. An extra point to be made is that if the model were to fully describe
the observed growth we would expect to find the fitted line to lie on the 45 degree line. We test this
hypothesis and show the in the bottom part of the two panels in Table 3. We can see that for the
full sample this hypothesis cannot be rejected in 8 of the 9 cases. This implies we can't reject a one
to one relation between the two growth rates for 8 of the 9 skill definition-elasticity of substitution
pairs. For the restricted sample this hypothesis is rejected when we use the College Graduates
skill definition and for one aditional case. Table 3 also shows that for the parameter values and
skill classifications used the model explains between 26% and 61% of the observed cross-country
6 For this figure we use a = 1.4 and the College Equivalents definition of skills. I also constructed this figure for
other definitons but I leave the extended discussion for the regression analysis.
variation in growth rates. Furthermore, for a given skill classification the R-squared of the growth
regression is increasing in u, and for a given value of o the R-squared increases as we narrow the
definition of a skilled worker. Finally we can see that the fit of the model is higher in the restricted
sample used in Caselli and Coleman (2006) than in the full sample.
So far we have analyzed the ability of the AZ model to capture the observed differences in
growth rates but the AZ model also has implications for the income distribution. To study this we
present the estimated income distribution for both 1990 and 2000 using the income levels relative
to the U.S. predicted by the AZ model and compare these to the estimated income distributions
using the observed income values relative to the United States. This normalization will not affect
the comparison between distributions since we normalized the calibrated values to fit exactly the
income level in the U.S. for all years. The results for this exercise are presented in Figures 4 and
578. The first thing to notice is that, independently of the value of o-, the predicted distributions
capture a salient fact, the bimodal shape of the income distributions in 1990 and 2000. This fact
has been documented by Quah (1996) and Jones (1997) for the 1980's and is still present in the
two years we study. Secondly, the model successfully captures the lower tail of the distribution and
upper mid range of the distribution for both years studied. On the other hand, the model is not
as successful in predicting the right tail of the distribution as well as the upper mid range of the
distribution. More precisely, the model predicts a higher number of countries with middle-to-high
income (the range between -0.5 and -1.7 in the graph) relative to the observed distribution and a
smaller number of high and middle-to-low income countries relative to the observed distribution.
This result stems from the following fact: if we calculate the ratio H/L/Hus/Lus by income
levels we find that the difference in this ratio between rich, middle-to-high income countries and
middle-to-low income countries is very small. For this reason the model overpredicts the number
of middle-to-high income countries. One last point to notice is that, as with the growth rates, the
model is more successful in capturing the observed distribution for higher o-.
One point made in the introduction is the shift observed in the income distribution from 1980
to 2000. Figure 6 shows that the model can partly predict this shift for the sample used in the
calibration exercise. More specifically, Figure 6 shows that the model can match the decrease in the
'For simplicity I present the results only for the College graduates definition of Skills.
8Differences in the estimated distribution for observed output in Figure 1 and Figure 5 arise as a consequence of
sample used. On the one hand, in Figure 1 we estimate the 2000 density using all countries with output reported in
2000. In Figure 5 on the other hand we estimate the density using countries for which there is information on the
capital stock, output per worker and skills for both 1980 and 2000.
density around the two modes, specially for the lower modal value. Furthermore, like the observed
distribution, the model predicts a decrease in the mass of countries with high and middle-to-low
income and an increase in the mass of countries with middle-to-high and low levels.
So far we have found that the AZ model successfully predict some salient facts of the income
distribution and we have shown the positive correlation between the growth rates predicted by the
model and the observed growth rates. The analysis so far, however, hasn't confronted the data to
alternative hypotheses for the process of growth. The next section will address this and show that
the model outperforms two popular alternative growth models.
2.3 Comparison Across Models
Since the late 1980's the literature on economic growth has been revived and many explanations
have emerged in order to explain the observed differences in income levels across countries. On the
one hand, since Romer (1986, 1990), a big emphasis has been given to endogenous growth theories
in explaining income disparities. On the other hand, as mentioned in Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (1997), a revival of neoclassical growth theory has taken place (see Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992), Barro and Sala-i-Marti (1995) and Young (1995)). In this spirit we confront the AZ/
Skilled-Biased technical change model of economic growth with two competing models. In doing
this exercise we are not taking any one model as the real data generating process, the objective is to
isolate potential channels for the observed output disparities. The first alternative model considered
is the neoclassical Solow growth model. This model emphasizes the role of factor accumulation and
exogenous technological progress as the key drivers of economic force. Comparing this model with
the neoclassical benchmark will be useful in examining the importance of cross-country relative
skills mismatches in the observed output differences. The second alternative model we consider is
the model presented by Caselli and Coleman (2006) (hereafter CC). This model takes into account
the role of relative skills and skill-biased technical change in an economy but differs from AZ by
arguing that not all countries share the same AHj. Hence, the CC model will be an important
benchmark to highlight the role of technology transfer and appropriate technology relative to the
skills of an economy in explaining income cross-country income differences. The objective of the
following exercise will be to compare and quantify the predictive power of these three growth
models.
For this purpose we perform a calibration exercise similar to the one described in the last section
and extending it to predict the neoclassical model and the CC model. For the neoclassical model
we use a Cobb-Douglass production function:
-NC 
_ ANCBNCkaN-"
where we construct labor as Ni,t = Li,t + H Hi,t to adjust for the different productivities\WLi,t/
between the two skill groups. Values for 'Hi are obtained from CC.
For the CC model on the other hand we use a CES production function similar to (2.3):
p (1 - at)/p
-CC = BC Ckozt _ hit +( x)iYi.t Lh t i I ((Lit) ) +(1 hlt
where is constructed using cross-country skill premium data from CC. As in Section 2 we
set BNC -BC 1 and calculate AtC and A C such that yust U ,it = yus,t. This implies
that
~ NC _ YUS,t
~ CC __U S't
t - p ( )/pit [-Yh ((Ai:; h -,t) ± (1- ThhOi,tpl
Finally the values for BNC and BrpCare calculated such that the predicted income for both
models match exactly the 1980 output for all countries in the sample, NC -NCY11, 980 Yi,198o Yi,1980,
which implies:
BNC Yi,1980
NC ka N1 "1980 i,1980 i,1980
BOC -Yi,1980
ANC k p 1(1 -a)/p
1980 i,1980 Ih i,1980 + 1 - Ih2i19 80
One challenge faced by the calibration exercise of the alternative models is that data for skill
premia in certain countries is available only for the 1980's. For this reason we have adopted five
different approaches when constructing the predicted values. In these five approaches we make
assumptions on the evolution of either """' or AHl and predict the other value with the relative
wage equation.
The first approach assumes that WILI has remained constant in the period between 1980 to
2H0 and use the 1980 values for entire exercise. If we extrapolate the U.S. experience to the rest
Of our sample this seems to be a very bad approximation. Acemoglu (2003) however shows that
he sharp increase in the skill premium experienced in the U.S. from 1980 to 2000 is the exception
mljonig a selected set of developed economies. All this suggests that this first approach is not as
ha -d as one might first think. Two allow for the possibility of secular variation in the wage ratio
wve adopt two approaches. First, we assume that the relative wage wHi,t has increased at the same
WLi,t
te as in the U.S. (i.e.H'/H -0 HUS HUS)- . and we also perform the calibration
sming that the wage ratio in the world has responded to changes in the skill ratio as in the U.S.,
{HUs, 10 WHUS,t* (WHUS,t_10 Hus,t 1 (Hi,t_10 WHi,t) * (WHi,t-10 Hi,t
Hust-10 WLUS,t WLUS,t-10 HUs,t Hi,t-10 WLi,t WLi,t-10 Hi,t
As was discussed earlier, the increase in relative wages in the U.S. has been higher than in other
rs. Furthermore the relative supply of skills in the U.S. is extremely high compared to th
)f tie world. For this reason the above assumptions might be overestimating the increase in
wage ratio. For this reason we calibrate the model using a fourth approach. More specifically,
ni e regression of the logarithm of relative wages in 1980 on the logarithm of the relative
S"in the economy allowing the coefficients to vary with skill levels, i.e.
In =WHi,1980 o + aR * I(H/Li > h') + # ln(Hi,1980/Li,1980) + (2.4)
WLi,1980
+-3 R in(Hi,1980/Lz, 1980) * I(H/Li > h') + Ei, (2.5)
K we calibrate the CC model and the
where I(.) is the indicator function and h' is chosen to be median skill supply in the sample.
pre et the relative wage relation using the estimated coefficients a, #, &R, BR.
The final approach assumes that the frontier of technology for all countries has grown at the
um m as the U.S. technology, which implies A",t'/ A"'t-o - AHUSt /AHUS,t-10
ALi,t ALi,t_10 ALUS,t ALUS,t-10
i what follows,to avoid excessive repetitiveness, we present results only for approach one, as this
he one that has the best fit compared to the observed data for both the neoclassical benchmark
a well as the CC model9 .
h, piicular this approach gave the highest 2 out of the five approaches for both the CC model and the
bsli henchmark. The definition of ,2 will be explained in detail below.
2.3.1 Results
I start by comparing three statistics across models for the sample of countries for which CC report
skill premia data. The first statistic we analyze is the average predicted output relative to the
observed average output. The second statistic we compare is the predicted variance relative to the
observed variance. Finally we analyze a measure of goodness of fit proposed in AZ, R2, where R2
is the "constrained R 2".In particular, let y denote output per worker in the data and let is denote
predicted output per worker by model s, then we define R2= 1 - ,y - E(Y) 2 . This is the
"R 2" from a regression of output per worker in the data on predicted values when we constrain the
slope to be equal to 1 and the constant to be 0. In general R2 would be equal to 1 if model s can
fully predict observed output and could potentially be negative if the fit of the model is particularly
bad.
The results are presented in Tables 4 through 6. Each table presents the results for a different
value of p, or equivalently a, in the range of values proposed by Katz and Murphy (1992). In each
Table we present three panels corresponding to the three definitions of skills we have used. Within
each panel (i.e. for each a and skill definition) I present the three statistics for the 1990 subsample,
for the 2000 subsample, and for the full sample.
The first thing to notice is that the CC model consistently underperforms compared to the
neoclassical benchmark and the AZ model for the three statistics presented. Moreover, it performs
particularly worse than the other two models for lower values of a and for broader definitions
of skills. When comparing the Solow model and the AZ model we can see that these two models
predict very well the average income in the sample of countries we study. To be precise, both models
predict average incomes which are 0.94 to 1.04 times the observed average income. Furthermore
there is no clear pattern over which model is better at predicted average income. Turning to the
variance the three models underpredict the observed standard deviation in the sample for all values
of a, but this underprediction is smaller for the AZ model. More specifically, the standard deviation
predicted by the AZ model is at least 84 percent of the observed variance while the Solow model
predicts at most 84 percent of the observed variance. The analysis for the R-squared shows a similar
picture to the one presented for the variance. In particular we see that the AZ model has a higher
restricted R-squared than the other two models for all values of a and definition of skills. The
tables also suggest two important points. The first is that the Solow model performs particularly
well compared to the CC model and performs almost as well as the AZ model when analyzing
the relative average and the constrained R-squared. As is pointed out by AZ, this highlights the
importance of differences in human capital and physical capital in explaining income differences.
The second point to notice is that both the fit of the AZ model and the CC seem to be increasing in
-. Furthermore the sensitivity of the CC model to changes in o- seems to be much higher than those
of the AZ model. In Section 4 of the paper we will estimate the models and show that the estimated
o- lies in the range of values that we have chosen for the calibration exercise which reassures the
above results.
Section 2 showed that the AZ model captured some important features of the income distribution
for the full sample of countries. So far we have shown, for the restricted sample in CC , that the
AZ model performs better than the neoclassical and CC models in capturing the observed average
income and the variance. In order to see if the models can capture other characteristics of the income
distribution, we compare the ability of the three models to explain the interquartile range of the
income distribution. In particular we plot the ratio of the 75th percentile to the 25th percentile
(75/25) of income for the observed and predicted levels. Figures 4 to 13 show the plot for the four
series. The figures highlight the increasing pattern from 1980 to 2000 in the observed 75/25 ratio
for the sample countries considered. This patten is successully captured by the AZ and the Solow
models while the CC model predicts a decrease from 1990 to 2000. One point to highlight is that
both the Solow model and the AZ model predict better the the 75/25 ratio in 2000 than in 1990,
but in both cases the latter model is closer to the observed ratio.
2.4 Estimation
The results obtained in Sections 2 and 3 rely on the set of values chosen for the parameters c and p.
The aim of this section is to validate the calibration exercise by estimating the production function
in (2.3) and comparing the estimated values to those used in the previous exercise. To do this I
will use a log linearized version of the production function and estimate the resulting equation by
OLS. In particular let the production function be
yit = U(t)Bi(t$k;)h + (1 -hYiyt h1(2.6)
where yit is output per worker in country i at time t, kit is capital per worker in country i at
time t, hit and lit are the the share of workers in country i at time t with high skills and low skill
respectively, At is a time varying technological parameter, B. is a country specific term and Uit.
The term Uit captures the effect on output of unobservable factors.
Taking the log of (2.6) we obtain the following expression:
Inyit = bi +at + a In kit + In Mit + uit (2.7)
where lower b t, , uit stand for In Bi, in At and in Uit respectively, and Mit =Yh ((p) hit> + (1 - tP
Now, doing a quadratic apporximation of In M around p = 0 we have
lnMit (1-C)'yHInhit+(1-a)(1--yH)Inlit+(1 -a)yHln AHt 6  (2.8)
ALt
((In hit)2 + (In lit) 2 - 2In hit In lit) + In AH(n hit - In )) ALL lht-llt
where t = (1 - a)yHln AHt + 7YH(1-YH)(-a)p InA 2 and #3 =2YH)(1-0)PALt 2 (in A) 2H(
Putting together (2.8) and (2.7) and applying the A(Axt xt - xt_1o) operator we obtain
A(In yit - in lit) O 1 + aA(ln kit - In lit) + (1 - a)yHA(ln hit - In lit) (2.9)
+3A (In hit - In lt) 2 + Tru (In hit - In lit) +
+7r2t (In hit-1o - In lit-io) + Atit
where Olt = A-t + -t.
We estimate equation (2.9) with OLS. When performing the OLS estimation we include a
time dummy to estimate Ol and include time dummies interacted with the (In hit - In lit) and
(In hit- 1 0 -ln lit- 1). We use robust standard errors in order to take into account for the possibility of
having non-spherical errors. The crucial assumption for the consistency of our estimated coefficients
is to have E(Anit|Xit) = 0 where Xit is our set of controls.
Table 7 presents the estimation results for the three definitions of skills used in Sections 2
and 3. Panel A shows the estimated coefficients from equation (2.9) and Panel B shows the
estimates for a, p and 7H implied by these.coefficients'(). Table 7 shows the estimated model can
account for approximately 60 percent of the observed variation of A(ln yit - In lit). Panel B shows
that independently of the measure of skills used the estimated coefficient for p lies in the (0,1/2)
porposed by Katz and Murphy (1992). Furthermore we can see that , for the exception of the
11 The standard deviation for a, p and -YH is obtained using the delta method.
wunn for Some College, the 95% confidence interval for the p is a subset of the Katz and Murphy
-e6 We can also see that the point estimate for ao is close to the value used in our calibration (1/3)
and that this values lies in the 95% confidence interval.
One caveat for the results found is the assumption of exogeneity of the controls included in the
':r-ession. More specifically, physiscal capital and skills are likely to be correlated with unobserved
d ,ract eristics determining output. Furthermore this variables are likely to be measured with error
oiatlng the potential biases in our estimates. Unfortunately finding good instruments for this
w bles is very difficult and goes beyond the scope of this paper. With this caveat in mind, the
-, results suggest that the parameters used in the calibration exercise are consistent with the
hlrved data.
2 5 Conclusion
ast twenty years several theories have emerged to explain the observed income differences
untries. One popular theory proposed by Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) higlights the effect
k Biased technical change in developing countries as a source of productivity differences. In
r, in line with the large literature on skill-biased technical change, the authors assume that
gical change depends crucially on the supply of skills of the country where technology is
d. The aim of this paper was to assess the empirical relevance of this source of productivity
csFirst, we find that the AZ model can account for the observed differences in growth
Kerm 1980 to 2000. In particular we show that the growth rates predicted by the model
* v(lly correlated with the observed growth rates for all the definitions of skilled workers
he exercise. Moreover, the model captures some important features of the world income
bution. Specifically the model predicts a bimodal distribution close to the one observed in the
ii order to to test the mechanism hypothesis porposed in Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we
re te predictions of their model to two alternative models. In particular we calibrate the
bt models and compare the predicted values to the ones observed in the data. First, we compare
o ufdel to a Cobb-Douglass production function with factor-neutral technological progress. The
kiusical benchmark will allow us to contrast the role of physical capital per-worker in explain-
foe (ifferences to the one porposed by AZ. We also contrast the AZ model to the model
atedl in Caselli and Coleman (2006). This model assumes that each country adopts a different
technology depending on their own skill supply as opposed to adopting the technology produced
by deloped countries. We find that the AZ model performs better than the two alternative model
when explaining the observed income distributions. In particular the AZ can account better for the
observed mean, variance and interquartilic range than both alternative models and has a better
goodness of fit, captured by a constrained R-squared measure. The neoclassical benchmark per-
forms almost as well in terms of predicting the observed averages and has a high R-squared but
underperforms in terms of capturing the volatility of output. Finally, I estimate the parameters of
the model and show that the estimates are close to the ones used in the calibration exercise which
reassures the results described earlier.
I conclude by pointing at two important limitations of the present paper. The first point we
want to raise is the issue of the sample used in Section 3. In particular we only used countries for
which we had estimated values for relative wages. This sample is not necessarily a representative
sample of the object of interest which is the entire sample". A related issue comes from the fact
that we only have values for relative wages around 1980 and we only observe one value per country.
Our results relied on extrapolations of the relative wage which might be far from the true evolution
of relative wages. It is our opinion that extending the data for relative wages is a promising direction
which would allow us to address the questions raised in this paper in a more accurate way.
2.6 References
" Acemoglu, Daron (1998). "Why Do New Technologies Complement Skills? Directed Tech-
nical Change and Wage Inequality." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 113, pp. 1055-108
* Acemoglu, Daron (2002). "Technical Change, Inequality and the Labor Market." Journal
of Economic Literature, vol. 40, pp. 7-72
* Acemoglu, Daron (2002). "Directed Technical Change." Reviwe of Economic Studies, vol.
69, pp. 781-810.
" Acemoglu, Daron (2003). "Cross-Country Inequality Trends." Economic Journal, vol. 113,
pp. 121-149.
" Acemoglu, Daron and Zilibotti, Fabrizio (2001). "Productivity Differences." Reviwe of
Economic Studies, vol. 69, pp. 781-810.
" To be precise, this sample underrepresents very poor countries.
" Autor, David, Katz, Lawrence F. and Kearney, Melissa (2005). "Trends in U.S. Wage
inequality: Re-Assesing the Revisionists." Unpublished Manuscript.
" Autor, David, Katz, Lawrence and Krueger, Alan (1998). "Computing Inequality:
Have Computers Changed the Labor Market:?" Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1998, vol.
113, pp. 1169-1213.
" Barro, Robert J. and Lee, Jong-Wha (2000). "International Data.on Educational At-
tainment: Updates and Implications." CID Working Paper No. 42.
" Barro, Robert J. and Sala-i-Marti, Xavier (1995). "Economic Growth." New York:McGraw-
Hill.
* Basu, Susanto and Weil, David (1998). "Appropriate Technology and Growth." Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, vol. 113, pp. 1025-1054.
" Caselli, Francesco and Coleman, Wilbur J. (2006). "The World Technological Frontier."
American Economic Review, vol 96, pp. 503-522.
" Hall, Robert E. and Jones, Charles . (1999). "Why Do Some Countries Produce so
Mouch More Output per Worker Than Others." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 114,
pp. 83-116.
" Summers, Robert, Heston, Alan, Aten, Bettina. (2002). "Penn World Table Version
6.1" Center of International Comparison at the University of Pennsylvania (CICUP), October
2002.
" Jones, Charles I. (1997). "On the Evolution of the World Income Distribution." The
Journal of Economic Perspectioves, vol. 11, pp. 19-36.
" Katz, Lawrence F. and Murphy, Kevin M. (1992). "Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-
1987: Supply and Demand Factors." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 107, pp. 35-78.
" Krusell, Per, Ohanian, Lee, Rios-Rull, Jose-Victor and Violante, Giovanni (2000).
"Capital-Skill Complementarity and Inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis." Econometrica,
vol. 68, pp. 1029-1053.
" Lucas, Robert. E, Jr. (1988). "On the Mechanics of Economic Development" Journal of
Monetary Economics, vol.22, pp. 3-42.
* Mankiw, N. Gregory, Romer, David and Weil, David (1992). "A Contribution to the
Empirics of Economic Growth." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.107, pp.40 7-43 8 .
" Quah, Danny. (1996). "Twin Peaks: Growth and Convergence in Models of Distribution
Dynamocs" Economic Journal, vol. 106, pp. 1045-1055.
" Romer, Paul M. (1986). "Increasing Returnsand Long-Run Growth." Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 94, pp. 1002-1037.
* Romer, Paul M. (1990). Endogenous Technological Change." Journal of Political Economy,
vol. 98, S71-S102.
" Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2002). "Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data."
The MIT Press.
" Young, Alwyn. (1995). "The tyranny of numbers: Confronting the statistical realities of
the east Asian growth experience." Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol.110, pp. 641-680.
2.7 Appendix 1: Figures and Tables
Figure 1. Distribution of Income Relative to the US 1980-2000
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Figure 2. Distribution of Skill Supply Relative to the US 1980-2000
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Figure 3. Observed and Predicted Growth Rates, o = 1.4, College Equivalents
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Figure 4. 1990 Observed Income Dist and Predicted Income Dist., College Graduates
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Figure 5. 2000 Observed Income Dist and Predicted Income Dist., College Graduates
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Figure 6. Evolution of the Income Distribution, 1980-2000
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Figure 7. 75/25 Ratio, Constant Wage, o- = 1.2, College Equivalents
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Figure 8. 75/25 Ratio, Constant Wage, o = 1.2, Some College
80 85 90 95
year
- - - - - 75/25 Observed 75/25 AZ model
-- - 75/25 Solow Model 75/25 CC model
Figure 9. 75/25 Ratio, Constant Wage, a 1.2, College Graduates
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Figure 10. 75/25 Ratio, Constant Wage, o- = 1.4, College Equivalents
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Figure 11. 75/25 Ratio, Constant Wage, ur= 1.4, Some College
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Figure 12. 75/25 Ratio, Constant Wage, a = 1.4, Colege Graduates
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Figure 13. 75/25 Ratio, Constant Wage, o = 1.7, College Equivalents
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Figure 14. 75/25 Ratio, Constant Wage, c-= 1.7, Some College
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Figure 15. 75/25 Ratio, Constant Wage, o= 1.7, College Graduates
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Figure 16. 75/25 Ratio, Constant A, o = 1.2, College Equivalents
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Figure 17. 75/25 Ratio, Constant A, o 1.2, Some College
Figure 18. 75/25 Ratio, Constant A, o = 1.2, College Graduates
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Figure 19. 75/25 Ratio, Constant A, o- = 1.4, College Equivalents
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Figure 20. 75/25 Ratio, Constant A, o = 1.4, Some College
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Figure 21. 75/25 Ratio, Constant A, c-= 1.4, College Graduates
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Figure 22. 75/25 Ratio, Constant A, - = 1.7, College Equivalents
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Figure 23. 75/25 Ratio, Constant A, o = 1.7, Some College
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Figure 24. 75/25 Ratio, Constant A, o-= 1.7, College Graduates
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TABLE I. Estim ation of wage premium
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TABLE 2. Implied Technology Levels and Shares
a=1.2 0=1- 4=.
YY1  A A AJMyAgA YA A AA-YA A YKt AkJ AA.JAJk
Panel A - Some College
1962 0.6206 10000 - 0.7157 1.0000 - 0-323 1.0000 -
1970 0.206 3.9613 3.9613 0.7157 1.9717 1.9717 0.8323 1.4620 1.4620
1980 0.206 33.4759 8.4507 0.7157 5.4595 2.7690 0.8323 2.5095 1.716
1990 0.6206 491.5564 14.639 0.7157 22.9829 4.2097 0.8323 6.1844 24844
200 0.6206 24058357 4,8943 0.7157 52.0272 2-2637 0323 10.0600 1.267
Panel B - College Graduates
1962 0.3074 1.0000 - 0.3919 1.0000 - 0069 1.0000 -
1970 0.3074 1.7032 1.7032 0.3919 12918 12918 0.5069 1.1482 1.1482
1980 0.3074 9.2443 5.4275 0.3919 2,8699 22216 LIN69 1.7378 1.5115
1990 0.3074 125.5835 13.5849 0.3919 11.6246 4.0505 0:5069 4.1893 2.4107
2000 0.3074 352.9001 2.8101 0.3919 19.99297 1.7144 0.506 5.8139 1.3878
Panel C -College Equivalents
1962 0.4582 1.0000 - 0.55190 1.0000 -0.7 -
1970 0.4582 2.8237 2.8237 0.5519 1.6640 1.40 0.720 1.3269 1.329
1980 0.4582 17.9456 6.3553 0.5519 39919 23990 0.C720 20984 1.5814
1990 0.4582 231.7384 12.9132 0.5519 15.7610 3.9484 06720 4.9854 2.3758
2000 0.4582 822.966 3.5501 0.5519 30.3822 1.9276 3.6720 7.3979 1.4839
Technology leves and shares coefficients obtained from the wage premiums regressions in Table I and the relative wage equation
in Section 3.
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Table 3 Growth Regressions: Observed 1980-2000 Growth and Predicted 1980-2000
Panel A. Full Sample
cd2SC ur:1ASC U1.0SC c=12,CE o 'ACE tr=7,CE 0=12 CG v=A, CG ct.7, CG
masstt 004 505 047 0.05 0.045 DJ3"' 0.057 -0.028 -1051
.48] [0.64] W044 [043] [00431 P.037] [.0411] [.047] [0.047]
predided 190-2000 grtti 0.971" 1.3"* 167" 122" 1.02" 1.06"1 1184" 1.252" 1.361'"
P.,14] [1 5] (15] p157J [0164] .f68] 0.167] [.1781 . iSD]
Observatons 81 81 |8 61 81 81 81 81 81
R-squared 0.251 0.27 D318 031 0342 136 .349 O33 0419
Null ypoths a=08=1
F 121 07 071 1. 127 578 215 1.31 2.15
Pfob>F 0.7 5516 01 0.346 0.288 O0.4 0123 5276 G.123
Panel B. Caselili-Coleman Sample
om12 SC a44, SC o=1J SC o-=1.2,CE i-4 CE o-=1.7, CE o=1ZCO C dA CC z=7,CG
constant -0.092 -D085 -0.084 -063 -.078 -002 -0,075 -1171" -0. 196"
.0731 [IMP] [0M [.D4] [002 [0.055 [0060] [.064] X 4]
predided 19,8-200 gwih 1180"" 124" 1.377"* 1-357' 1-377" 1A36" 4 " 48W 1U42 1.55I "
[209 P-217] I2241 [52181 [224] 0.233] [0.329 [0327] [.327
Osenations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
R-squared 0431 0.447 1474 U.479 050' 0.508 0,527 -584 01514
Nul Hypotnesir-Of==1
F 0 S5 1,42 1.35 234 412 3.34 5.35 71
ProbF 0.419 0 -324 251 0.257 1009 0.023 0.045 0.08 0002
SOardard enorsinbracs, "p<S 1, "pEI3.l5 n p .. Gi
SC sisnds a som~e olegeCE sands fr Coeg sEquivalentsand C~stands nr Cdlege~ Grauaes.
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Table 4. Comparison Across Models, r=1.2
Panel A. Some College
Acemcglu Zibdi Ndel Augmented Solw Modl I Casefli-Oleman 1
Mean Variance R-squared Mean Variance R-squared Mean Variance R-squared
1990 101168 093277 0.97905 0.94910 078290 0.97205 014443 028118 022013
200 14420 0:96576 0.96642 0.97120 0.76573 09550 0.11359 D29875 0.17959
fui sample 1.02948 095801 097200 96048 0.77722 0.9280 012B48 0-29180 0.19783
Panel B. Colege Equivalents
Acemogu Ziibati hodel Augmented Solow Model 1 Casek-Cdleman 1
Man Variance Rsquared Mean Vmance R-squared Mean Vanance R-squared
1990 0.90974 0.87560 097860 096500 0.82599 0.97683 043509 0.32327 0.0169
2C 0.9668 088118 0.96831 0.97320 0.78973 0.96033 044273 0.35925 .59891
full sample 0.97845 0.88165 .97285 0.98920 0.80707 0.96761 043902 034305 0.00473
Panel C. Colege Graduates
Acemglu Zilboci Model Augmerted Soatw Modl I CasedliCleman 1
Man Vaiance R-squared Mean Variance R-squared Mean Vaiance R-squared
1990 0.95330 0.86270 097805 0.97508 0.84301 0 97838 0.52868 0.35402 070716
2000 0.96524 0.84983 96729 0.97955 0.79703 0,9190 0.53420 137861 0.68109
fuI sample 0.95942 0.85718 0.97204 0.97735 0.81799 0.96917 053063 038787 0.9272
Mean and Vadance are the ratio of tie predction of the statsic byte ndel compared tote obsaved statisc.
A]! the values are calulated usng the samplefroni Casseli and Cdeman (2006.
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Table 5. Comparison Across Models, Tr=14
Panel A Sen Clege
Aegn Ziltibat Model S&bo Model I CasECdean 1
Mean Varince R-squared Mean Variance R-squared Man Varancef R-squared
1990 o9273 91814 0.7944 0.94910 078290 0.9725 323092 0.29071 0GA968
2000 102293 194032 0858 02120 0.76573 0.95550 .2632 030:164 0A1472
Ssample 1.01 37 193540 0I7324 06048 Q.777M 09820 029905 0.22515 045121
Panei B College Equivalents
AEmogb ZilibotiModel SdaN Model 1 Case-Cleman 1
Mean Vadaice R-squamed Mean Vadance R-squared Mean Vadance R-squared
1990 D96-20 D2 394 227907 0966D0 082599 097683 0D.815 43311 078742
200O 0,97957 1-935 10  90824 .97320 078973 0.9833 D.64101 044334 0.76571
ful sample D 97403 0.93748 0.273. 0. 920 0.8077 0.9681 0 960 043543 0.80858
Panel C. College Graduates
Amma4iat Model Stb Madel I Cas&cleran I
Mean Varare R-squared Mean Varance R-squared ean Variance R-squared
1990 98316 .24500 5.93065 0.27508 0.84301 077838 0084 048443 6983
2000 099136 1@3498 0U850 27955 0.79703 0.98190 071123 01.47104 0.4570
fUi sample 0.98735 0.94010 0.936 297735 0.81799 0.96917 071053 0.4778h 025640
Mean andVuiadnee are te rab ofihe predeon tofie statisc by the nod comparedt' the obseRed stafistc.
Althe alues are cabulated using the sarmefromCassei and Coleman (20DS)
Table 6. Comparison Across Models, tr=17
Panel A. Soene Coege
AwmguZiboi Model Agnwted Sdow Model 1 Cas*iCdeman I
Mean Vaiance R-squared Mean Vaiance R-squared Mean Variance R-sqaed
190 983313 0903327 09.79730 0-949095 0.782903 0-972050 .509197 0 353949 .70840181
2000 1001983 0.915963 .068813 0.971199 0765725 0 55496 0448375 0.345282 a83724133
tuB sample 0.992920 0.913723 0.973633 0.96479 0.777225 0.062803 0-477723 0.348284 0.66873613
Pare! B. Colege Equivalents
Aoermog Ziboti Model AQnerted Sow Modell Caselli-Cdeman 1
Mean Vaiance R-squared Mean Vaiance R-squared Mean Variance R-squared
190 0.968416 .880829 0.979572 965005 0.825991 97682 0.759360 0.545911 0.90394652
20)0 0.974885 01872081 .968033 0.973197 0.789728 0.960327 0.762381 D.538111 0.88548988
fut sample 0.971715 0876054 1973126 .69195 .807069 0.967608 0.760885 .541174 0.89366802
Panel C. College Graduates
AcemogluZilboti Model AUnered Solow Model 1 Caseli-Codeman I
Mean Varance R-squaed Mean Variance R-squared Mean Variance R-squared
1090 0.84917 897182 0.981033 0.975080 0843011 0.978383 0.811535 0.597120 U92981808
2000 0989275 0.872650 R968374 0.979554 1797030 0.961900 0812552 0507144 0908143
fuBl sample 0-087123 884097 0.973960 0.977347 0.817987 0960172 0812022 .584564 091825193
Mean and Variance are the ratio of die average predicdnda model compared to the observed sabaik
Al the values are calcuated using the sample frorn Casseli and Coleman (2006)
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Table 7. Comparison Across Models,: -=1
Panel A Some Co eg e
Acemiog 1ti Md Ar7ented Sdaw bde2 Caselli-Colenn 2
Mean StDe. R-squared Mean CoDe. R-squared Man St6a R-squard
1990 1:01168 0,9327 .90705 29 160 0.3203251 0.4 4 00 0.0187 0.a 2777 097648
203 1.042 0.206576 096642 0:25094 0.337284 0.4276 0.98C215 0.806799 009123
Ui s Ja 1.2948 0.95801 1097200 0277342 0.32981 0454523 0.977009 a. 1878 0.6768
Panel R College Eqivalents
Acemo u Zitd lidel Augmented Sow Adet2 Case-Coleman 2
Mean Dev. R-squared Mean SDe'. R-squared Man StDe Psquared
1990 I.96974 L.8756 N 97860 I 774060 0. 23891 0:2816 02976223 0.8540D 0.979167
2000 0.983868 0.88 18 98831 073532 0.543581 0.876 0.75255 a511101 062323
ul sa e 17.845 0.88 15 197285 0337554 0572323 08922 '0.75682 9.830345 186689
Panel C- Cdlege Graduates
Acem4g Ziboti Model Augmented Sobw Mdet 2 Caseidlern 2
Mean SDev. R-squared Mean SLDe R-squared Man StDe. R-squared
1990 0.0330 0.86270 00805 0.74074 0.20444 0927359 0.85061 089044 0.0047
20OO 98524 0.84993 78729 032.87 0537324 0.184233 1982613 0I882171 0.9636.2
ful sampe 0959.42 0.85718 0137204 04263,2 0.57582 03231 0.083749 0.842146 007091
Mean and Set. are the ratio of tea erage predidta of a model compared to ihe observed stastics
Al the values are calularted using te sa mple from Cassdi and Cdernan (2[06).
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Table S. Comparison Across Models, v-=1A
Panel A. Some Colege
Acemogluibotti Model Sal Model 2 Caseli-Coleman 2
Mean SLDev R-squared Mean StDev. R-squared Mean StDev. R-squared
1990 199703 0.91814 0.97944 365976 0.339569 0.576284 0.966120 819861 0.975852
2000 .02293 -94032 0.96856 0.314869 0.347080 0.508135 0.980066 0797022 .958542
full sample 1.01037 0-93540 0.97324 0.339532 0.340615 0.53810 0.973286 0809607 .966167
Panel B. College Equivalents
Acenoglu ibtti Model Solw Model 2 Caselli-Coleman 2
Mean StDev. R-squared Mean StDev. R-squared Mean StDev. R-squared
1990 .96820 0.93694 0.97907 R834563 .692829 0.951183 0.974398 D349855 0.978731
2000 .97957 0.93610 0.96824 .788653 0.602488 0.913036 0.974073 .808011 0.962061
full sanple 0.97403 0-93748 0.97302 0.800443 0.635261 0929839 0974184 0.826423 0.99404
Panel C. College Graduates
Acemoglu ibotft Model SolowModel 2 Caselli-Coleman 2
Mean St.Dev. R-squared Mean 3Dev. R-squared Mean StDev. R-squared
1990 0.98318 94500 0.98065 0.843510 0.703700 .95005 0.983499 .865284 0.979853
2000 0.99138 0.93498 0.96850 0787175 0611315 0921580 0981502 0.817754 0.963471
full sarmple 0.98735 0.94010 0.97386 0.814340 0.645412 0.936303 0.982419 038368 0.970687
Mean and SLDev. are the ratio of ie average predicion of a model compared to the observed stalistic.
All the values are cakulated using the sample from Casselli and Coleman (2005.
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Table 9. Comparison Across Models, 17
PanelA Some College
Acemnglu Ziboti Model A.gmented So- Mode 2 Casdi-Cdeman 2
Mean StDe. R-squared Mean StDe. R-squared Man StDev. R-squared
19 0 .983313 090332 0.79730 14648 0377097 061880 0962233 01912098 0975183
200 1001983 U01593 0&98812 R396422 .33350 0.609782 0.975862 0783270 0957930
M sample 0.922.20 0913723 0R97333 .4254a6 0338452 0.154 969235 0.801224 0965535
Pandl & College Eqivalents
Acemrgu Zihtio Mod Augmented Solow Mod 2 Casefi-odeman 2
Mean 2Dev. R-squed Mean StDe. R-squared Mean StDev flsquared
1990 0 8416 0.880829 0079572 0900844 O775343 0.960887 0972544 0.845487 0.97438
2000 0974285 .S72-48 0.9683 3 064143 0676217 0.41793 903.9 G.14124 001787
full sample 0971715 0.876954 0.973126 1870180 a712764 1154167 H972783 08224'6 2069121
Panel C. Cdlege Graduates _
AcemguZiliboti Model Augmened Solow Model 2 Casdi-Cdeman2
Mean StDev. f-squared Mean StDev. squared Mean S.ev. fR-squared
P90 0984917 .8 9712 0.08 1033 02020: 0785417 0Q70930 .981889 0.861321 979038
2000 0)69275 287250 83074 .852969 0284404 045672 298052 813716 2963244
fu sample 0 87123 8840 7 0973950 0.876613 720288 205 707 2&137 0834463 2070465
Mean and ,.Cevj are the rato of t e average predicton of a model comparedto the observed s~saile.
All the values are calculated using the sample from Casselli an )eman (2005.
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Table 10. Comparison Across Models, Full Sample, Constant Wage
Panel A College Equivalents c=1.2
Acemoglu Zilboti Model Solow Model I Casei-dweman 1
Mean StDev. R-squared Mean SDev. R-squared Mean StDev. R-squared
1990 0.96147' 089788 0.97954 0990238 0.889091 0.980501 0522755 0216135 0.707391
2000 092650 83803 0.95520 0.947325 0.8 0.954033 0.507109 0337352 0665072
full sanple 0.94318 .85932 0.96576 0967722 0.837121 .965501 0.514807 0326718 0.84481
Panel B. College Equivalents,01. A
AcemogluZi boti Model Solo Model 1 Casel-Coleman 1
Mean StDev. R-squared Mean StDev. R-squared Mean SLDev. R-squared
1990 0.99553 0.93507 0.98225 .990238 889091 0.980501 0.714079 0A92541 0.873147
2000 0.95454 .866 0.9580 0.947325 0806388 0.954033 0.683543 .474028 0.831472
full samiple 0.97404 0.89107 096885 .967722 0.837121 0.965501 0698061 479274 0.849923
Panel C. Colege Equivalents, 4=1-7
AcmoguZiiboti Model Solow Model Caselli-Coleman 1
Mean StDev. R-squared Mean Stev. R-squared Mean StDev. R-squared
1990 099764 0.93634 0.98262 0990238 0889091 .980501 0.820089 0.624341 0.933143
2000 0.95224 0.86062 0.95866 .947325 0.8 8 .954033 0.783497 0.581218 .896136
ful sample 0.97380 0.88762 0.96904 0967722 0.837121 .9655001 800881 0,59247 0.912333
Mean and 3.Dev. are te ratio of fe average predicion of a model ompared to the obseried statistic.
AllI the values are cakulated using the sample of countries with information on capital, output and Education.
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Table i. Comparison Across Models, Full Sample, Constant AitWAAt.
Pand A College Equinents 0=12
AoernoluZjiMoi del Slow odel2 Casdli-Coleman 2
Mean atev. Rsquared Mean StDev. R-squared Mean St0ev. Rsquared
199 0.96147 &29786 Gz97954 0.78233 0N79636 026585 0 994264 02943H 1972179
2O 0. 92650. 3203 -,20 0679589 0449508 EB54522 9.941449 0787717 0946310
- saple 034318 .85932 0 575 1728293 0.497478 0.85584 0967105 022849 G957430
Pand B. College Equivalentsgc=1A _
Aemoglu 3iiboti Moddl Sdow Model 2 Casei-Coleman2
Mean Stk ev. R-squared lean St1ev. R-squared M ean Stlev. R-squared
1990 0Q9553 0.3507 025 0254378 0.674583 0.955245 0 9751 0.89094 0.972111
2000 0.95454 0.266 15 F753154 0520353 0.87323 0I94CB22 0785668 0.946120
I s lie 0.97434 O.39107 36885 IB0 26 0 5 354 022235 0M95W6 0225946 0.957249
Panel C. College Equivalents, cr47
Aoemoglu lihoti Ndel Saw Model 2 Caseli-Cdeman 2
Mean 2Dev. R-squaed Mean StDev. R-squared Mean StDev. R-squared
1990 099764 0.93624 0,62 .914909 Q71946 0971680 G991213 0287533 .871825
2000 0U5224 Q.C 062 0250 0.18145 QS 0058 1 92631 996 .783786 0945929
fl saple 097380 088762 0.904 0.6421 056324 L.94538 0 .964904 0.23517 .95h70F
lean ad 20ev. are he ratio of be averagepredialon of a model compaed to the obser ed statiste
Ali the values are Calculated using the sample of cau tries with information an capita, output and Education.
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Table 12. Estimation of CES Model
Panel A
dependent variable: An(yit-lil) Some College College Equivalents College Graduates
Aln(ki-) a.39" 3934'" 0392""
[R033 [0050] [0.033}
Aln(httr 0.225" 0.203" 0173'
DI069 [0.081] [0.102]
Aln(hit-lit) 0.064'" 0.052" G0.42"
[.017, [0.016\ [0.021]
Observations 326 32t 323
R-squared 0.63 061 0.69
Panel B: Implied Parameters
a 03941" 0.3w"3
11033] 05] [0.033
0.371'" 0.335*"' .234'
[0.1131 [0,13621 p 16 1]
p 0452"' 03852'" 0.339"'
[0-071]| {00574 [0071]
standard errors in brackets,** p<0.01,* p<o.05, * p<o.
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Chapter 3
Demand Uncertainty, Information
Quality and Sectoral Entry
3.1 Introduction
Entry decisions are at the heart of many economic and strategic problems. Agents constantly
have to make entry decisions into different activities and these decisions have consequences on the
allocation of resources, competition and the efficiency of a market economy. Furthermore, in many
circumstances these decisions are accompanied by uncertainty of the payoffs for these activities
and the actions taken by other players. Examples of such situations vary from the researcher who
chooses to write about field A over field B, the political candidate deciding whether to appeal to
a conservative constituency or to a liberal constituency or the firm who has to decide in which
sector of the economy to operate in. All this suggests that information and information quality
have an important effect on agents' decision and competition. One important implication of this is
the potential inefficiency of the equilibrium outcomes that arise in these models. Banerjee (1992,
1993) and Bala and Goyal (1994), for example, show how sequential decision making by agents
who have incomplete information of the profitability of their investment opportunities can lead to
inefficient choices. Rob (1987) also points at the inefficiencies of the market equilibrium in a static
model of entry under uncertainty. Moreover, these inefficiencies can have important macroeconomic
implications for the growth rate of the economy, specially when there are spillovers and learning
from other agents in one's sector, and for the amplification of sectoral shocks (see for example
Caplin and Leahy (1993)).
In this vein the present paper has two objectives. The first is to explore the relation between
entry decisions by agents and the quality of the information they have prior to entry. For this
purpose I study a simple two stage model of entry. In the first stage a continuum of agents
decide the sector of the economy they will operate in. Following the entry stage agents engage in
monopolistic competition where they make positive profits which depend negatively on the level of
entry to the sector they operate in and positively on the demand of the sector. At the time of entry
agents are uncertain of the true state of demand for each sector. This uncertainty is partly revealed
by a private signal of the relative demand of sector one with respect to sector two which is observed
before the entry decision is made. The signal has a direct and an indirect informational effect. On
the one hand, a higher signal suggests a higher demand for sector one which, other things equal,
would make entry to sector one more attractive. On the other hand, signals are correlated across
entrants, which implies that a high signal also predicts higher potential entry into sector one. These
two conflicting effects behind a high signal will be essential in determining the equilibrium of the
game. I show that the quality of the information received by agents, measured by the preciseness
of the signal they receive, will be crucial in determining which of the two forces dominates. In
particular, when the precision of the signal is low, the direct effect of a high signal dominates the
indirect effect and the equilibrium of the game is a pure strategy threshold equilibrium in which
agents enter sector one whenever they receive a positive signal. Once the signal received by agents
becomes more precise, the indirect effect becomes stronger and the equilibrium of the game is a
mixed strategy equilibrium. Furthermore, I show that the equilibrium probability of entry to sector
one is increasing in the value of the signal received and decreasing in the level of precision of the
signals.
The second objective of the paper is to analyze the effect of both information quality and
fundamentals on competition, generated by entry decisions by agents, and welfare. In general
there are two potential sources of inefficiencies in the model discussed: the first one comes from
the monopolistic structure of the post-entry game and the second one comes from the uncertainty
faced by investors at the moment of entry. When analyzing welfare I will use a constrained efficient
notion where I take the competitive structure of the two sectors as given and focus on the second
source of potential inefficiency. I will also assume the social planner has full information of the
demand for the two sectors. I start by showing that without uncertainty the equilibrium entry
level into the two sectors coincides with the efficient entry levels. This implies that the level of
competition in the two sectors is socially optimal. Once I introduce uncertainty the discrepancy
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etween the equilibrium entry level and the efficient entry level will depend crucially on both the
precision of the signal received by agents and the value of the relative demand of sector one with
respect to sector two. I start by showing that the relation between the precision of the signal
r((eived by agents and the discrepancy between the equilibrium and the efficient level of entry is
non-mionotonic. In particular, when the equilibrium of the game is a pure strategy equilibrium
(a JOw precision level) there is a U-shaped relation between the precision of the signal and the
dicrepancy between the equilibrium and the efficient entry levels. Moreover, for each relative
demand level there is a unique level of precision such that the equilibrium entry level is efficient.
Slast point suggests an important issue: small increases in information quality, captured by an
increase in the precision of the signals, might generate excessive competition in one sector and too
little competition in the other market. Once the precision increases, and the equilibrium of the
m is a mixed strategy equilibrium, the discrepancy between the socially efficient entry level and
he eqtuilibrium entry level is decreasing in the precision of the signal. In particular, for low levels of
oPison there will be excessive competition in the sector with high relative demand and too little
-minpetition in the sector with low relative demand. As information quality increases, equi-librium
mmpetition levels become closer to the socially efficient level. The discussion above points at an
mipr~tant result of the paper, increases in information quality can be socially detrimental. More
-pec(ii cally, small imporvements in information can be socially costly while drastic improvements
m i)nj ation quality always lead to welfare improvements. Next I show that the relation between
eniv demand and the discrepancy between the efficient and the equilibrium entry levels is non-
unic. 1 show that, independently of the quality of information, when sectors are equally
Kb (relative demand equal to one) the efficient entry level and the equilibrium entry level
I . This result implies that uncertainty affects efficiency as long as consumers have a stronger
a Fo)r one sector over the other. When the two demand levels are not equal, the relation between
e t ' dermand and the discrepancy in entry levels is non-monotonic and will depend on the quality
i trmation. On the one hand, when precision is low, there is a twin-peaked relation between
r iv a ridand and the discrepancy in entry levels while there is an inverted U-shaped relation
ien the precision is high. All this points at the intricate relation between information quality,
rativ demand and efficiency. It also highlights an important point of the paper: small increases
in the level of precision of the signals might increase or decrease welfare depending on the value of
mive demand and the quality of information.
his paper contributes to the literature of entry and efficiency. Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and
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Mankiw and Whinston (1985) were among the first to study the efficiency of entry into markets
when there is full information. Both papers point at the importance of product substitutability in
determining the efficiency of equilibrium entry. Two papers which analyze a similar entry decision
but assuming demand uncertainty are Jovanovic (1981) and Rob (1987). In both models the
equilibrium is one where agents are indifferent between entering or not entering and they randomize
over this decision. Furthermore, Rob (1987) highlights that the random nature of equilibrium entry
makes it inefficient,a result that comes from the assumption of a discrete number of entrants. There
are two important differences between these papers and mine. The first difference is that they study
the entry decision of a discrete number of entrants into one industry while I consider the case of
a continuum of investors deciding between two sectors. This will imply that in my model entry is
constant and not random. The second difference is that they solve their respective models assuming
a particular precision level for the signals that agents receive prior to entry. This paper on the other
side, allows the precision of the signals to vary which enriches the equilibrium and welfare analysis
and, as I pointed above, highlights the interaction between information quality, fundamentals and
welfare. In this sense, my work is related to Angeletos and Pavan (2007) and Morris and Shin
(2003) who analyze the welfare implications in games where agents receive noisy signals of the
fundamentals. Contrary to what Angeletos and Pavan (2007) find I show that the relation between
welfare and precision is non-monotonic.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will introduce the model and characterize the
equilibrium of the game with full information. On section 3 1 examine the model with incomplete
information and characterizes the equilibria of the game in this case. Section 4 analyzes a tractable
example which highlights the main results of the paper. The summary of the results and the
conclusion are left to Section 5. All proofs and figures are left to the appendix.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Preferences and Technology
Household and Consumption Good Producers
I start by describing the baseline model. Consider the following two period economy where the
representative household maximizes a utility function of the following form
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2
U = ~ Ai In Ci (3.1)
subject to the budget constraint
2
=PtC I
where Ci is a consumption good produced in sector i and I is the income level of the representative
consumer. The choice of the utility function will give a simple relation between the expenditure in
consumption good i and the income level of the household.
Let Y be total production of good i. Good i is produced by a perfectly competitive producer
using a continuum Mi of intermediate goods indexed by j. The mass of intermediate producers M
will be determined endogenously and will be of crucial interest in what follows. Specifically, the
production function for consumption good i takes the following form:
Yi=(I (O--'Idj) ,o> 1 (3.2)
Each household is endowed with one unit of labor, which is used for production in the two
sector of the economy, and a balanced portfolio of all the firms in the economy. Taking this into
account the budget constraint of the household can be rewritten as
2 -M1  M2
K PiCi w + H1jdj + 112idj
where w is the wage rate of the economy and IIji are the profits of firm j in sector i.
Intermediate Good Producers
Production Each intermediate good i is produced by a monopolist. Each monopolist has an
identical linear production technology satisfying the following equation
yij = q * lij (3.3)
where lig is the labor employed by firm j in sector i and q is a labor productivity parameter.
The production function for the intermediate producers (3.3) implies that the marginal cost of
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producing intermediate j in sector i is
w
MCij = -
q
Entry Before any production or consumption takes place a mass 1 of potential intermediate
producers have to decide which sector to operate in. I assume that investors make this decision
simultaneously and that their objective is to maximize future profits.
Labor Market The intermediate producers' production function implies the following labor
market clearing condition:
1 ljdj + M 2jdj
0 0
To close the description of the model I summarize the timing of events:
1. Investors decide which industry to operate in.
2. Given the entry decision, firms set prices and agents decide how much to consume.
3.2.2 Equilibrium
Throughout this section I will use Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) as the equilibrium concept.
In particular I will be able to solve the game using backwards induction. Before proceeding to the
characterization of the equilibrium I will start by defining an allocation in this economy.
Definition 11 (Allocation) An allocation in this economy is:
i) a pair of numbers (M 1 , M 2 )
ii) a pair of vectors of intermediate productions (y1j) A', (y2j) 12
iii) a pair of vectors of labor demands (11j)" ,(l2j)M2
iv) a pair of consumption levels (C, C2 )
v) a pair of consumption good produclions (Y 1 , Y2 )
vi) and prices w, P1 , P2 , (2P1 j)]f 0 , ( AP12)j0
Next I will define an equilibrium in this economy. At the time of production and consumption
all the agents in the economy have full information with respect to the fundamentals A1 , A 2 and
the number of producers in each sector M 1 , M 2 . This implies that the second stage equilibrium
can be described as:
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Definition 12 (Second Stage Equilibrium) An equilibrium in the production and consumption
stage is an allocation such that
i) (C*, C21) solve the utility maximization problem in (3.1)
ii) 'U* Pi)13L 0 solves the profit maximization problem of intermediate firm j in sector i.
iii) (Y*, P*) solves the profit maximization problem of consumption good producer i and the zero
profit condition.
iv) there is labor market clearing
v) all the goods market clear
In the Appendix I show that there is a unique second stage equilibrium of the economy and this
equilibrium is characterized by the following allocation:
a q
y* Vi j (3.4)
Y* aiqM -1)
(o -1) q
a-M 1 /(1-o)
P*= (o-u 1) q
The second stage equilibrium implies that the profits of firm j in industry i are:
ozi
F Mi (o-(-.1)
where ai = Aj/(A 1 + A 2). Equation (3.5) will be crucial in the discussion which follows. In
particular, it captures the problem that firms face in the first period. On the one hand firms will
have an incentive to enter into the sector which yields the highest fundamental profitability of the
two, i.e. the sector with the highest a. On the other hand, higher a. will attract more entrants into
sector i which will decrease the profits of a firm in that sector. For this reason higher fundamental
profitability will have a direct positive effect on a firm's profit and an indirect negative effect through
the equilibrium number of entrants. The interaction between the fundamental profitability and the
number of entrants will be crucial when I analyze entry decisions in the next subsection and specially
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in the game with incomplete information. In general the profit function in (3.5) highlights a tension
which is important in many economic problems where good fundamentals attracts more economic
agents into an economic activity.
This tension between sectoral profitability (or demand elasticity) and entry has been highlighted
in contexts similar to the one presented here by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Jovanovic (1981), Mankiw
and Whinston (1985) and Rob (1987). But the tension implied by equation (3.5) goes beyond this
specific economic model and can be framed in many other contexts. To mention some examples
of situations where this tension is present we have political candidates choosing platforms based
on voter's preferences, firms investing in new technologies based on future demand or an academic
choosing a research topic based on the current hot topic. For this reason the theoretical contribution
of this paper goes beyond the scope of the specific model presented and highlights a more general
economic force.
Equilibrium with Full Information
I start by characterizing the first stage equilibrium of the game when agents have full information of
future profitability A1 and A 2 . First stage strategies (si) will be mappings from the pair of sectoral
profitabilities {A 1 , A 2 } to the binary decision {Enter Sector 1, entering Sector 2}
s : {A 1 , A 2} ---- {Enter Sector 1,Enter Sector 2}
I assume the entry cost to all industries is zero. If this was not the case we would have
three possible actions for each investors, no entry, entry into industry 1, and entry into industry
2. Setting the entry cost to zero will allow me to focus on the main goal of this paper which is to
study the entry decision across industries1 . I start by defining an equilibrium of this game.
Definition 13 An equilibrium of the entry game with full information is a set of strategies { s*}1
a set of industry participants, {MAl* }1 , and an equilibrium number of opened industries, N*,such
'Jovanovic (1981), Mankiw (1985), Rob (1987) introduce a fixed cost of entry and focus on the binary decision
of whether to enter or not. As has been highlighted by Caplin and Leahy (1993), the sectoral entry decision adds
important macroeconomic implications.
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that the following conditions hold
2
i=1
AA-A__ > Aj Vi
M* M9*
N* 2
This conditions are easy to interpret. The third condition tells us that with a continuum of
players all industries must be opened. This follows form the fact that if this was not the case,
opening a new industry would yield infinite profits to the deviator. The first condition is jusf the
condition that all investors participate in some industry, which by assumption is costless. This will
be the case since not entering yields zero profits while entering to one of the two industries will
always result in positive profits. The second condition is a condition that no investor wants to
move to another industry which is currently in place (No bunching). All this conditions together
imply that the equilibrium number of entrants to each sector must satisfy:
A 1  A2
M1* M2*
Which means that any full information equilibrium of this game must have Mj* = a= A
Vi E {1, 2}. Clearly there are multiple equilibria to this game since any strategy vector {s,}
which yields Mg* = a is an equilibrium. However, the equilibrium number of entrants to each
sector, M*, and the number of opened sector, N*, are unique in any equilibrium. All this is
summarized in a proposition below.
Proposition 14 (Full Information Equilibrium) There are multiple equilibria to the full in-
formation entry game presented above. In all of this equilibria the equilibrium number of entrants
to each sector is uniquely determined by the following expression
A-
Mi=A1 + A2 = z
The optimal number of entrants into each industry reflects the underlying tension of the model:
higher relative fundamental profitability of the sector implies higher profits and more entry into
the sector. In equilibrium these two opposing forces balance out across sectors making entrants
indifferent across sectors.
130
Socially Optimal Entry
So far we have focused on the profit maximizing behavior of entrants. This individually optimal
behavior might not necessarily lead to an efficient allocation of resources in the economy. I will try
to address this question in what follows.
In the economy described above there are two potential sources of inefficiencies. The first
comes from the monopolistic competition which takes place in the second stage and the second
potential source of inefficiency comes from the entry decision by investors. The goal of this paper
is to understand the second potential source of inefficiency for which reason I will focus on the
constrained efficient problem below. The objective function of the social planner is
WS = max [ai In a1 qM 1 1 - a 2 in a2q(1 - M 1 )1/(O-1) }Mi . . J +C I ~~
where I use the second stage equilibrium consumption, Cf = aiqM
Solving this problem yields the optimal social number of firms:
Ms - a1, M -
We can see that the socially optimal number of firms is equivalent to the equilibrium number of
firms which implies that equilibrium entry in the game with full information over the fundamental
profitability of each sector is constrained efficient. This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 15 (Socially Optimal Entry Level ) The full information equilibrium number of
entrants to each sector, { M*, M2*}, is constrained efficient. That is, taken the second stage com-
petition as given, { M*, M2* } maximize the utility of the representative consumer.
One question we might ask now is how robust is this result to changes in the information that
investors have at the moment of entry. In the next subsection we change the model such that agents
have imperfect signals of a 1 and a2 at the time of entry. Introducing this change in the information
structure of the game will yields a set of interesting predictions compared to the full information
case. In particular I will show that the equilibria of the game are not necessarily socially efficient
and that the level of inefficiency varies with the true value of a 1 and with the precision of the signal
that agents get prior to entry.
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3.3 The Model with Dispersed Information
In tIis section I will assume that the information available to investors is imperfect. In particular,
assure that investor's j entry decision is taken before observing the true realizations of A 1 , A 2
but after receiving a private signal, xj, of the relative future profitability of the two sectors which
takes the following form:
wcre a = ln A1 -ln A 2 is the log of the relative profitability of sector 1 with respect to sector 2
Js a shock which is independent and identically distributed across individuals. For simplicity
a to be randomly drawn from the real line (improper prior) and e. to be identically
d independently distributed across agents with a distribution F, .symmetric,with mean zero and
l 7n The improper prior assumption implies that agents will only use information on the
uand the distribution of e when making forecasts about other agents' signals2. Furthermore
m the following condition holds
f'(z) < 0,Vz > 0 (3.6)
f'(z) > 0,Vz < 0
), =F'(z). Notice that before investor j receives the signals both industries are identical.
ense we say that we have ex-ante homogeneity across industries.
H-owAever, before deciding which industry to enter investors receive a signal about the state of
d-mental profitability of the two sectors. The above discussion implies that the expected
a bility difference conditional on the signal is:
i innish the description of the primitives of the model, notice that when forecasting player h's
player j calculates the following distribution
Xhkcj - Xj + Eh -j
der assumption would be to have a proper distribution for a which is much more dispersed than the
ibuton of E.
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I will call the distribution of the difference Eh - Ej G, which from the properties of F is symmetric
and has zero mean. Furthermore, given that (3.6) holds, we have the following condition
g'(z) < 0,Vz > 0 (3.7)
g'(z) > 0,Vz < 0
where g(z) = G'(z). Distribution G will determine how informative the individual signals are about
other player's actions. This will prove to be essential when characterizing the equilibrium of the
game in the next section.
3.3.1 Equilibrium characterization
Before characterizing the equilibrium of the game let's define strategies in the game with dispersed
information. A (symmetric) strategy here is a mapping from the signals to the simplex, the
probability of entering industry 1 in detriment of industry 2. Hence we have
Si : x -> [0, 1
where xo is the signal that agent j receives. Notice I am restricting the analysis to symmetric
equilibria in which agents with the same signal value play the same strategy, or in other words the
identity of the investors is irrelevant, only the signal value matters. Let's define i(xy) to be the
probability that player i enters industry 1 under the strategy profile Si and conversely let 1 -j (xl)
be the probability that agent i enters industry 2. Define a strategy profile S = to be
the collection of all strategies from investors. To finish with the description of the game we have
to define the payoffs of each investor. We know that once the entry decision has been made the
profits on investor j are
- (o - 1)M,
Given the logarithmic preferences of agents, we can focus on the maximization of the expected
log differential profits. This differential profit for an agent with signal value x.- given a strategy
profile S is:
1 - M1 zyj,S
E [Arx , S] = x n + In Mill ( I)\§
M1 (xy, S
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where M1 (x_, S) is the expected number of entrants to industry 1 given strategy profile S and
a signal value xo, and Ax ln II 1 - In I 2 . The formulation highlights two important features of
the model. The first is that the number of entrants to each industry is an endogenous object
which depends on the strategies. This implies that the signal value has two effects in the expected
differential profits. The first is the direct effect of signals on profits, a higher signal value makes the
expected profits of industry 1 higher. The second effect is the indirect effect which works through
the forecast of the mass investors in each industry. In general these two effects will go in different
directions as higher entry into a sector yields lower profits for each entrant in that sector.
Next I define an equilibrium of the entry game with imperfect information.
Definition 16 An equilibrium of the entry game with private signals is a set of strategies S*=
(q)ij[o,1] such that for every i E [0,1]
q* = 1> E [A In x,, S*] > 0
q (0, 1) < E [A ln 71xj, S*] = 0
q.= 0 #: E [A ln rxx, S*] < 0
and
M1 (xi, S*) q*(y)g(y - xo)dy
Notice that the last line requires investors to make rational forecasts of the number of investors
in each industry. Also, the last condition uses the fact that
Pr(xh < ylxi) = Pr(xi+ h - Ej < yJXi)
= G(y - xi)
Pure Strategy Equilibrium
I will start by characterizing the pure strategy equilibrium of the game with dispersed information.
I choose this starting point for two reasons. The first reason is that it will highlight the properties
that G(-) must have such that investors make positive expected profits. The second reason is that
for a similar class of games with dispersed information but with strategic complementarity of
actions, a pure strategy threshold equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game3 . This class
3See Morris and Shin (2003) and Angeletos and Pavan (2007).
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of games are dominant solvable for which reason the finding the unique equilibrium of the game
is straightforward. The entry game presented here is not dominant solvable precisely because of
the strategic substitutability in players' actions, making the characterization of the pure strategy
equilibrium of the game less straightforward. However,as Proposition 7 shows, if there exists a
pure strategy equilibrium of the game it must be a threshold strategy where everyone enters the
sector with the highest signal.
Proposition 17 (Pure Strategy Equilibrium) If there is a pure strategy equilibrium of the
game it must be a threshold strategy where everyone enters the market with the highest signal.
That is
1 if x > 0
gi = [0,1] if xi = 0
0 if xi < 0
This is an equilibrium of the game if and only if the following condition (condition P)
G(z) < 1exp(Z) if z > 0
G(z)-> ePz if z < 01±exp(z)
holds.
Proof. In the Appendix *
Condition P gives us the requirement for a pure strategy equilibrium to exist. The economics
behind this condition will be important to understand. The existence of a pure strategy equilibrium
requires that the direct effect of the signal dominates the indirect effect for every signal level.
Condition P suggests that this will occur if the distribution of the difference in shocks is sufficiently
dispersed, that is, if signals give entrants little information of the signals of other investors.
So far I have showed that under condition P there exists a pure strategy equilibrium of the
game. In what follows I will analyze what will happen when condition P is violated and whether
there are other types of equilibria of the game. In particular I will show that when the signals
received by investors become more precise the direct and the indirect effect of the signal balance
out giving room for mixed strategy equilibria.
Mixed strategies
Now we turn to equilibria where a positive mass of investors randomize over which industry to
enter. It will be useful to write the expected number of entrants to industry 1 conditional on a
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iga! x and strategy profiles S as:
M1 (X, S) = f-D (y)g(y - x)dy.
where (x) is the probability that a player with a signal x enters sector 1 under strategy profile
S[Prmn the pure strategy case one can hint that any mixed strategy equilibrium will have a
hre.Ihid structure, that is there will be an interval of indifference and outside of it investors play
ure strategy entering the sector with the highest signal4 . For this reason I restrict the analysis
regies of the following form:
0 if x < A
qi (x) = 4(x) [0, 1] if E
1 if X >
A> A. If agents follow strategy qi(x) then the expected number of investors who enter
1 conditional on a signal x is:
M1(x, q) J4#(y)g(y - z)dy + g(y - x)dy (3.8)
O(y)g(y - z)dy + (1 - G(2K - x))
' g(z) to be an equilibrium strategy the function #(x) has to satisfy certain properties which
w,, h highlighted in the following Proposition.
P-o position 18 (Mixed Strategy Equilibrium) Assume there exists a function #*(x) E [0, 1]
A A), with _A >0> A, #*(A) = 1,#*(A) 0,q4'*(A) = #*(A) 0 satisfying
#* (y)g(y - x)dy = + - G(x - A), Vx E (_A, K) (3.9)
1+ ex
#*(y)g(y - x)dy > ex G(x - ),Vx >
#*(y)g(y - x)dy < ex -G(x - A), Vx < A
i ie he appendix I show that all mixed strategy equilibria of the game must have this form.
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0 ifx < A
Then q(x) = 4*(X) E [0, 1] if X [A,A1
1 ifx> A
is an equilibrium of the game.
Proof. In the Appendix. m
The pure strategy equilibrium and the mixed strategy equilibria share a common feature. In
both cases agents receiving very high (low) signals will enter sector 1 with probability 1. There
is also a region of the signal space where the two forces behind a good signal balance out and
investors are indifferent between the two sectors. For the pure strategy equilibrium case this occurs
at exactly x = 0 while for the mixed strategy equilibrium this occurs in a range of signal values5.
Further analysis of the mixed strategy equilibrium for any general g(-) is a difficult task which
goes beyond the scope of this paper6 7 . For this reason in the next section I will study the mixed
strategy equilibrium of the game for a particular distribution g(-) which gives a closed for solution
for #* (x). This special case will highlight some important characteristics of the model and will allow
me to analyze the welfare implications of the model.
3.4 Equilibrium Characterization: Special Case
I will study the equilibrium of the entry game for the following distribution
f (X) = eax, a > 0 (3.10)2
This probability distribution will prove to be useful in solving explicitly the integral equation in
(3.9). The parameter a, which will be crucial in characterizing the equilibrium, will determine the
variance of the shock and will also determine the variance of the derived distribution G(x)". With
this distribution we can derive the distribution g(x) using the transformation theorem The next
lemma characterizes the distribution of eh - ej and the properties of this distribution.
Lemma 19 If eJ,Eh are each distributed according to(3.10), then the random variable ej - eh has
"As we will see in the next section, this range of indifference will potentially be the entire signal space.
"This is true for many commonly used distributions like the normal distribution.
7 See Polyanin and Manzhirov (2008)
"In particular we can see that Ef(x) = 0 and Vf(x) - 2.
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a pdf
g (x) - e-alxl + Ix eaa
4 4
and a CDF
Ce" (1 -x( ) if x < 0G(x) = 2
1 e (1+ Xg) if x > 0
Furthermore
OG(x) > 0(<0) if x > 0(< 0)
Oa
Proof. In the Appendix *
The properties of the distribution imply that there is a value a* such that for a < a* we are in
the parameter region where condition P holds. In fact, we can see that a necessary condition for
condition P to be satisfied is g(0) < 4(0), which implies that a* = 1.
I turn to the characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium of the game. The next propo-
sition shows that for the distribution of shocks that we have chosen, there exists a function # that
solves the integral equation of interest.
Proposition 20 The strategy
q*(x) =(x) (3.11)
where
a4 e4 x + (4a4 + 2a2 - 1) e3 x+
O(x) = e (6a 4 + 2a 2 + 11) e 2x+ E (0, 1) Vx E (-oo, oo)
a4 (1 + x)5
(4aa - 2a 2 - 11) ex + (a 4 - 2a 2 + 1)
is a mixed strategy equilibrium of the game if and only if a > a*.
Furthermore, for x > 0, k(x) < 0, and x < 0, a() > 0
The above proposition shows that in the special case we are considering, the unique continuous
and differentiable mixed strategy equilibrium when condition P is violated is 4(x)9 . This suggests
that for low levels of a the equilibrium of the game is a pure strategy threshold equilibrium while
for higher values of a the equilibrium is the mixed strategy equilibrium characterized above. The
above proposition also highlights an important point: the probability that an investors enters the
"There may be other non-continuous or non-differentiable function which constitute a mixed strategy equilibrium.
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sector for which he has the highest signal is decreasing in the precision of the signal. The above
discussion is illustrated in Figure 1 in the appendix which shows how the equilibrium of the game
varies as the precision of the signal (a) increases.
The mixed strategy equilibrium presented above relates closely to the previous literature of entry
under incomplete information. Previous work by Jovanovic (1981) and Rob (1987), for example,
have characterized a mixed strategy equilibrium for similar entry games as the one presented here.
The main difference is that both these authors solve their models for a specific level of precision
of the signal. This is precisely the main contribution of this paper, to highlight the interaction
between agent's strategies and the precision of the signals that agents receive and to show the
conditions for a mixed strategy equilibrium to emerge.
Having characterized the equilibrium of the game I turn back to the welfare analysis of the
model. Section 2.2 pointed out that the entry game with complete information had constrained
efficient levels of entry. The next section will analyze how this result changes once we introduce
incomplete information at the entry stage. In particular I will show that the welfare costs of having
imperfect signals at the moment of entry will vary with both the level of precision of the signals
that agents get and with true level of relative demand of sector 1 with respect to sector 2.
3.4.1 Dispersed Information and Welfare
This section analyzes the effect of having uncertainty at the moment of entry on efficiency. In
particular I will focus on how the equilibrium entry level and the optimal entry level differ using
the special case for f(e) studied above. As I did in section 2.2, I will focus mainly on a constrained
efficient analysis where the second stage monopoly power that firms have is taken as given.
Given the assumption that there is a continuum of entrants, the potential inefficiency in the
equilibrium with dispersed information lies in the discrepancy between the equilibrium entry level
and the social optimal entry level'(). For this reason the welfare analysis of the model boils down
to the comparison between the equilibrium entry level into the two sectors and the efficient entry
level. As I pointed out previously the optimal entry level to industry i is ai = Aj/(A 1 + A 2) which
is a measure of how much consumers value good i consumption. The equilibrium level of entry to
"'This comes from the fact that there is a continuum of entrants and for that reason the equilibrium entry level is
a constant.
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sector i on the other hand will be given by the following expression
Mi(a, &) J q*(x)f (x - a, a)
where q*(x) is a threshold strategy for a < a* and #(x) for a > a*. I will start by analyzing the
welfare properties when the precision of the signal is low (a < 1).such that there is a pure strategy
threshold equilibrium. The next proposition shows that for a specific combination of a and a the
equilibrium entry level coincides with the socially efficient entry level.
Proposition 21 If a < 1 the following holds:
i) the equilibrium entry level is
le"a- if -a < 0
M1 (a, a) = 2
1 - je- aif a > 0
ii) For each level & there exists a unique level of a, (a), such that M1((&),a) MT(Z).
Furthermore we have the following
< 0 if a < 
-d(),
Oa
and
01M,~a)- M~ala)I> 0 if a > a(a)
ca
iii) < 0 if ; < 0, a > 0 if > 0
Finally if a = 0, MS (0) =M (a, 0).
The above proposition shows an important result of the paper. When the precision of the
signals received by investor's is sufficiently low (a E (0, 1)) there is a U-shaped relation between the
absolute difference in the equilibrium number of entrants and the the socially efficient entry level
(IMIS(i) - M1 (a, a)1) and the precision of the signals, a. The proposition also suggests that if the
social planner can choose a before entry takes place and he knows the value for a when choosing
a, then social efficient entry level can be achieved. This could arise if we added an extra stage in
which the social planner invests in improving information dissemination among investors at some
cost. One caveat to this conclusion arises when the social planner does not have full knowledge of
a at the moment of choosing a, in which case socially optimal entry is achieved with probability
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zero. Furthermore, as can be seen from the proposition, the cost of misstargeting a can be very
large.
The second thing to notice form the proposition is that uncertainty is inefficient as long as
consumers value one sector more than the other. Furthermore, as can be seen in Figures 2 and 3,
there is a non-monotonic relation between the discrepancy between the equilibrium and the efficient
entry level and the relative demand of sector 1 with respect to sector 2.
Now I turn to the analysis when a > 1 and the equilibrium is a mixed strategy equilibrium.
As I will show, when the precision is sufficiently high (a > 1) there are two cases under which
the socially efficient level of entry is equivalent to the equilibrium level of entry: one is when the
two sectors are equally profitable (& = 0) and the other is when the precision is sufficiently high
(a -> oo).
Proposition 22 If a > 1 the following holds:
i) lima,-,M1 (a, a) = MS (a)
ii) M1 (0) = Mi(a, 0)
As was the case when a < 1, uncertainty is inefficient to the extent that sectors are not homo-
geneous. Furthermore, the above proposition suggests that as the signals become very precise, and
uncertainty vanishes, the efficient entry level is achieved. Figures 4 and 5 complete the analysis
for the case when a > 1. The first thing to notice is that for a given value of i the discrepancy
between the socially efficient entry level and equilibrium entry level is decreasing in a. This implies
that when the equilibrium of the entry game is a mixed strategy equilibrium it is always socially
beneficial to increase a. This goes in contrast to what occurs when a < 1 where small increases
in the precision might be welfare detrimental. This suggests that if the social planner was given
the choice to increase the precision of the signal before learning the value of a, he would prefer to
set a > 1 and as large as possible.Another point to notice is that increasing the precision of the
signal is particularly beneficial when a1 has a value of 0.2 or 0.8. This suggests that the gains
from increasing the precision of the signal received by investors are larger when one sector is more
profitable than the other but the relative profitability is not to large.
3.5 Conclusion
I have presented a simple model of entry across sectors with incomplete information where I high-
light the effect of both the precision of the signals received by agents and the relative demand of
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one sector relative to the other on equilibrium entry and welfare. A crucial characteristic of the
model presented is the tension between the direct effect of a high signal received by agents, a high
relative demand, and the indirect effect of receiving a high signal, higher entry. The equilibrium
of the game is driven by this tension and in particular by the precision of the signals received by
agents. I show that when the precision of the signal is low, the direct effect of the signal dominates
the indirect effect and a the equilibrium of the game is a pure strategy equilibrium in which agents
enter to the market for which they receive a higher signal. This is a consequence of the fact that
when the precision is low an agent's signal is not too informative of other agents' signals. As
the precision increases, signals become more informative and the indirect effect of signals becomes
stronger. This gives place to the emergence of a mixed strategy equilibrium where agents randomize
over the two industries.
The model presented also sheds light on the effect of dispersed information and information
quality on competition, generated by agents' entry decisions, and efficiency. I show that the differ-
ence between the socially efficient level of entry and the equilibrium level of entry depends crucially
on the precision of the signal and the true relative demand value. In particular I show that the effect
of the signal's precision on welfare is non-monotonic. For low levels of precision there is a U-shaped
relation in the discrepancy between equilibrium entry and the socially efficient level . Furthermore,
there is a unique precision level for which the two entry levels coincide. Once precision increases,
and the equilibrium of the game is a mixed strategy equilibrium, the difference in entry levels is
decreasing in the precision level. This implies that when the precision level is low, small increases
in precision might be welfare decreasing. The model finally shows that the relation between welfare
and relative demand depends crucially on the precision level and is in general non-monotonic.
I conclude by discussing a couple of possible extension to the model presented in this paper
which could be interesting to explore in future work. First, the model presented studies a static
entry game. One potential change to this assumption is to have incumbents making production
and pricing decisions prior to the entry decision by investors. If this is the case the incumbents'
actions become public signals of the sectoral demand and directly affect the entry decision by new
firms". Adding this extra stage could add interesting implications to the welfare analysis (namely
first period welfare and second period welfare) and the dynamic pricing decision of incumbents.
"Harrington (1987) studies a similar idea in a linear demand/Cournot environment where firms face uncertainty
of the cost of production and the elasticity of demand is known. Studying this case in a context as the onw presented
here could lead to a richer set of predictions and highlight the interaction of demand elasticity, entry deterrence and
welfare.
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Moreover, if we assume that there is learning in the production function the entry deterrence motive
of incumbents can have important implications for cost reduction and growth. Second, the model
assumes that the quality of the signals received by agents is exogenous. Furthermore, the paper
emphasizes how the quality of the signals affects the equilibrium entry level in the economy. For
this reason one interesting extension would be to endogenize the precision level and understand the
private incentives of entrants to invest in higher quality signals. Related to this issue is the cost
of information. In the model discussed here I have assumed that signals are costless. Analyzing a
model with costly information can lead to interesting connections between credit constraints, entry
and sectoral development. Finally, throughout the paper I have used specific functional forms
which have allowed me to solve explicitly for entry levels and welfare. One important direction for
future work is to generalize the present context and study if the results obtained hold under a more
general framework.
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3.7 Appendix 1: Proofs
3.7.1 Second Stage Equilibrium of the Game
From the log preferences of the consumer we have that demand for the consumption good i is:
PiCi = At- I vi'A1 + A2
Each consumption good producer will maximize profits, which gives the following intermediate
good demand:
YiY ( ji)
The zero profits condition of the final good producer implies that
-Mi
Pi =
1/(1-a)
P1 -dj
which is also the marginal cost of producing one unit of consumption good i. Taking these
demands into account, we know the intermediate good's profit is:
-Ti = Jpi,(
which implies that the optimal price is
01 W
P * = c -a -1 q
Using the optimal price for each intermediate producer implies that the marginal cost of con-
sumption good i will be
pM
P* "dj)
= ijgMi -- M "
o- -1I q
Taking this into account we have that the profits of intermediate producer j in sector i will be
T q -
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Sq)
We also know that in equilibrium we must have that there is market clearing which implies
Ci = Y. Using the demand for the consumption goods we have:
aeq(o--1)
YZ3 - o-wm M W
c = (- 1)
o-wMi
7F.. =W* + j r
where oi = Ai/(A1 + A 2 ). We also know in equilibrium we must labor market clearing which
implies
1 = M1 1i* + M212
where lV =Mi l'dj. Now, normalizing the wage rate to 1 and using the labor market clearing
condition we have:
7rijdj 1
Putting all this together we have that the equilibrium allocation in the second stage is:
M ,
Y*1/(o-1)
w*=1
T w
P* = I(1U M7
-
1
o- -7 1 q3r P iq
3.7.2 Proof of Proposition 7
I proof proposition 7 in parts. I start by proving the following lemma.
Lemma 23 In any pure strategy equilibrium where q* (x) = 1 we must have that for E -+ 0, either
q* (x + e) = 1 or q* (x - e) 1.
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7r .
Z-7 )
Proof. If we assume that this is not the case, then we would have
x+e +In ( -Mi(X + E) < 0
2xE+nI(1- - M1(x - E) M 0
1-M (+ e) - M1x-)
2x + In I M(+)+Iln -W -E)< 0
SM 1 (x+e) M1(x -E)
If we take the limit when E -- 0 of the expression above we have
x +ln(nI i '5X) < 0
which violates the fact that q* (x) = 1. *
Then converse argument follows for the case when q* (x) = 0. This implies that any pure
strategy equilibrium of the game will have intervals where investors play the same strategy.
Next I show that any pure strategy equilibrium must be a threshold equilibrium.
Proposition 24 Any pure strategy equilibrium must be a threshold equilibrium.
Proof. From lemma 1 we know that the pure strategy equilibrium of the game will have
intervals of investors playing the same strategy. This implies that
Mi(x) q*(y)g(y - x)dy
1 -G(x41 - x) + (G(xn - x) - G(x,- 1 - x)) +
+ (G(x,,_2 - X) - G(Xn-3 - X)) + ... + G(x1 - x)
where x 1  x2 < ... < xn <xn+1-
Given the assumption that g(-) is single peaked, we know that at most M(x) will also be
single peaked.. That is, either Aj(x) > 0 V x, Mj(x) < 0 V x, or there will be a unique finite x
such that Mj(x) = 0. Given this we have that all equilibria of the game have either two or three
intervals. It is straightforward to see that a strategy where every player enters one industry is not
an equilibrium. To see why there can't be three
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intervals notice this would imply that either
M1(x) = G(X2 - X) - G(x1 - x) (3.12)
or
MI(x) = G(xi - x) + 1 - G(x 2 - x) (3.13)
Notice however that in (3.12) we must have
1+ G(x1 
- X2)
X2+lIn =0
(1-G(x1 - X2))
which only holds if x2 < 0 and hence q* (0) = 0. But when 0 > x 2 > x 1 we have that,
In(1 - M1 (0) >0
(Mi (0)
which contradicts the assumption that q* (0) = 0.
Now take (3.13), then we must have
22
Gr~n(r2 - r 1 )-
- G(x 2 - 1i))
But notice that since - G(xr2 - x1i) > G(x 2 - x1) - ), we must have xr2 > sr1 > 0 which implies
that q*(0) = 1
However, in this case we have that
In G(X2) - G(x 1 ) < 0
I - (G(X2) - G(x1 ))7
which contradict the assumption that q*(0) = 1. M
The above proposition states that we only have to consider threshold pure strategies as the
potential equilibria of the game. One natural thing to predict is that under certain conditions the
equilibrium of the game will have a threshold type strategy in which everyone follows their highest
signal. It will turn out that the condition we need, to have a threshold pure strategy equilibrium,
is:
G(z) < G(z) if z > 0 (3.14)
G(z) > G(z) if z < 0
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where
U(z) = exp (z)
1 + exp (z)
Finally I show that the threshold must be at 0 and that condition P must be satisfied.
Proof. From the above proposition we know that the only type of pure strategy equilibria of
the game will be threshold strategy equilibria. First take the threshold strategies where agents
with signal x < k enter industry 1.. In this case we will have that the share of people in industry
1 is
Pr(xh < klx 3 ) = Pr(xj - EJ + e < klx)
= 1 - G(xj - k)
In this case the indifference condition for an individual with signal k is
k +lIn (1) = 0 <-> k = 0
But if the threshold is at k = 0, notice that for xj > 0
A7r(x) x + ln ( ) > 0(1 - G(x))
which contradicts the argument that this is an equilibrium.
Now take the following proposed threshold strategy equilibrium where every one with signal
difference Ax = X1 - x 2, enters industry 1 if Ax > k and enters industry 2 otherwise. Notice that
given the proposed equilibrium, the number of investors in industry 1 predicted by an investor with
signal Ax is
Pr(xh > kjxj) = Pr(xj - Ej + e > klxj)
- G(x - k)
Given this, the differential payoff between following the strategy and deviating for an investor
with signal difference Ax is
Ar(x) =x + In (1 - G(x - k)
(G(x -- k)
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For this to be an equilibrium we must have
A7r(k)= k+lIn 1 G(0) =k= 0(G(0))
Hence the only candidate threshold equilibrium of the game is the one where k = 0. Now, for
this to be an equilibrium we need that for Ax > 0 the following holds
Air() = x + Iln - x) >(G (x) ) 0<-> G(x) < ep(X)1 + exp (x)
and for Ax < 0
Ar(Ax) = x + In (1- G(x) <G (x) ) 0 < G(x) <
which completes the proof. m
Lemma 25 The mixed strategy equilibrium can not be
1 if x < A
(AX) E [0, 1] if x [A,A
0 if x > A
Proof. Suppose the above structure is an equilibrium. This implies
M(X,S) g(y - x)dy + (y)g (y - x)dy
C(A - x) + /qLy)g(y - x)dy < G(2K
Notice that M 1 (oo) = 0 and M 1 ( -oo) 1, which contradicts the argument that q*(oo) = 0 is
a best response for an agent with a signal x -> oo n
This condition arises for the same reason as in the pure strategy case. For investors to stop
entering the industry where they expect to have the higher demand it must be that the mass of
investors entering that industry has to be sufficiently large, but this can not arise as an equilibrium..
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exp (X)
+ exp ()
() =W
3.7.3 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. By the discussion of the pure strategy equilibrium we know that any candidate mixed
strategy equilibrium must be of the form
0 if x < A
i (x) = h(x) if x E [A, A
1 if x > A
Notice that for the agents with signals x E (A,A) the following indifference condition must
hold:
A-r(x) = X + In 1 M1(, ( )= 0
(M1 (X, 0)
where M1 (x, i) is defined in (3.8). The indifference condition implies
M(x) = 1 + ex
which using the definition of M 1 (x, ) implies
h(y)g(y - x)dy + (1 - G(A - x)) e
'~y~gky 1+ ex' Vx C [A, A]
We must have A> 0 > A. To see this notice that if A > A > 0, this would imply that
1
Mi(x) < 1 - G(A) < -
2
which contradicts the fact that q*(x) = 0. A similar argument can be made if A < A < 0 since
in this case 1 - G(A) >
Differentiating (3.15) with respect to A, A we obtain the following two conditions
(h(A) - 1) g(2K - x) (3.16)
-h(A)g(A - x) = 0
which are satisfied if and only if h(A) = 1 and h(A) = 0.
(3.15)
Differentiating (3.15) with respect to A, A a second time we obtain the following two conditions
h'(K)g(K - x) + (h(K) - 1) g'(A - x) = 0 - h'(K) = 0
-h'(A)g(_A - x) - h(_A)g'(A - x) = 0 -> h'(A) = 0
Now, an agent with x > A wants to enter industry 1 (2) if the following condition is met
r(Ax) = x + In 1 - M1(x,)
Mi(x, q))
Jis condition implies that the following inequality must be satisfied:
h(y)g(y - z)dy < ()
1+ e
G(x - K),VAx , oo
-- Proof of Lemma 9
LTma 26 If E is distributed (3.10) the random variable E. - eh has a pdf
a a -h a ad
g(x) = e alrr4 Xa-e alxJ4 4
G e"(1 - x) if x<0
G(x) = .a
1-- je (1+ xa) if x > 0
&C(x) > 0(< 0) if x > 0(< 0)
Proof. First we know that g(x) has mean zero since E(eg Eh) = 0 and it has variance 4/a 2 .
ly a determines the dispersion of the distribution G(x). Define the variables u = h(x, y) -
X. We can rewrite everything in terms of v, u as: x = v, y = v - u. The Jacobian of the
m crnation is
1
=-1
1
I nce we have that the joint density of u and v is:
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> ( )0
I hrmb> ;aore
= f(v)f( - U)
= le-a(lvl+lv-ul)
4
Finally we want to find the distribution of the random variable u. We can find this by integrating
over
oo 2
(U > 0) a_ -a(lv|+lv-ul)do
4 4
(U < 0) a e-alv|+Iv-ul)dv -
- a 4
a2
-e- a(2v-u)dv
4
- a 2 e a(2v -u)dv+
4u 4
4 4
a aau dv +
u 4
This can be rewritten as
a a2
g(x) = -e ax| + IXI e -aix|4 4
which is precisely the claim. Now we want to find the CDF of g.
(x < 0) a e- alui + ,ae-aluI du
.- (4
1 ax
= -ex
4
I ax 2
_ead
. _ 4
-eax _ x a ax
4 4
= e (1 - a
2 k2
/ x
.- oo
(a au
~4
-
a du
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a(2v 
-u)dv
_ a2 eau du
4
h" " (U, v)
./0 a_ 
2
Jo 4
(x > 0) + ( ea + eau )du=
1 1 , a efx 2  a ud
2 4( -O 1 4-eu
-ax 1)+ xae ax +
3 1 -ax a ax
4 4 4
1 /xa
1 
- e--" x 1+ x )
1
_ 1(,eax~1
Hence we have that
G(x) { leax(1- x) ifx<0
1 e--" (1 + oX) if x > 0
Notice that when x < 0 we have
1 ax
aa 2~
a Xax aax a ax
x -~e -e -eax 2 < 0
and for x > 0 we have
- e-2
ax 1+ x )) 1 -ax-- Xe -- e2 4
ax+ x e
4
= ze-ax 2 --ax > 0
4 4
To finish notice that
G(x) 1 - G(-x)
U
3.7.5 Proof of Proposition 10
Lemma 27 The function
a 4 e4 x + (4a 4 + 2a 2 1) e
(6a4 + 2a2 + 11) e2x+
(40 4 - 2a2 11) ex + (a4 - 2
3x+
a + 1)
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JOx ae -a du
4
ax
ex
(X)L a 4 (1 + ex) 5
- (e
satisfies the integral equation
+ ly - xa ealy xl dyIA ex 1e-(1 -G(A -x)),Vx E(A)
for any A, A. The equation satisfies #(x) = 1 - #(-x), f(0) =,'(0) > 0,limc) #(x) =
1, lim W-eo #(x) = 0.
Proof. We start by solving the integral equation (3.17). This can be rewritten as:
+ (x - y)a e-a(x-y)) dy(Y) (ae-a(x--y)
+ 4(Y) ( a-a(y-
ex -
= - G(x - A)1 + ex
2
-x) + (y _ ae
4
Differentiating with respect to x we get:
- y)e-a(x-) dy + 0(y) (y
-g(x -)
(1 + e)
Differentiating a second time with respect to x we get
#(y) _a C-a(-y) + (X
.a 4
a
4
4
+ / " #(y) ( ay -x) -a(y - -) -
(1 - ex)= eX 3(1-(2-
(1 + er)
From the original integral equation we have that:
X) ae a(y-x) dy4 ~
a(x-y)) dy +
a(y-x)) dy
dy - a2  e -
I + ex a 2G(x - A) - a2
.IA -aiy- idy4
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(3.17)
a(y-x)) dy
#(y) (-(x
a2 0(y) ly -- x| aI- )
(y) e.-aly-xi
So we can rewrite the second derivative as:
#J, (y)a ea(x-Y-)dy + #(y)a ea(y x)dy - 1x 42 1e+e + A
-2 (1e +
which is again an integral equation. Differentiating this with respect to x we have:
-x 2 -d2
- 1 (y) e(-9dy a + #(y) e
4x 4
e ( 2
2a2 (1 + ex) 2 K 4(1 , + e2x)(1+ ex) 2
-a(yx)dy
2
- A) 11(x
a2
and finally differentiating a second time we get:
aO(x) + a2
2
ex (1 - ex)
2a 2 (1 + ex)5
-
g'(x-
ja4
(a 2 (1 + ex)2 - (1 - 1Oe, + e2x) -
a2
Replacing with (??) and solving for f(x) we have
ex
a4 (1 + ex)5
(4a4
a4 e4x + (4a 4 + 2a 2 - 1)
(6a4 + 2a2 + 11) e2x
2a2 _ 11) ex + (a4 -
3x+
2a2-+ 1) +
+29-g'(x -A) G(x
a a
Notice that
ea(x-A) _ (x - )a ea(x-A)
2 4
g '(x x) = (  - ) a e4
g'"(x - A)
a4 _aa(x-A)
2
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(3.18)
-yIdy
#(x)
G(x - A)
(x - )a ea(x-A)
4
This implies that 2 9'(x-A) /4A - G(x - A) = 0. Putting this together gives the solution
to the integral equation
#(x) = ex
a0 (1 + ex)
We have that #(x) E (0, 1) Vx if a >
strategy equilibrium.
Notice that
04 (1 + e-- )5
1
= (1 -e
a4 e4x + (4a4 + 2a 2 - 1) e3 x+ 
(6a4 + 2a 2 + 11) e2x+
(4a4 - 2a 2 _ 11) ex + (a4 - 2a 2 + 1) J
1. This implies that for a < 1 the equilibrium is a pure
a4e- 4x + (4a + 2a 2 1) e- 3x+
+ (6a 4 + 2a 2 + 11) e-2x + (4a4
+ (a4 - 2a 2 + 1)
2a 2 - 11) e-x
a4 + (4a4 + 2a 2 _ 1) ex + (6a4 + 2a2 + 11) e2x+
+ (4a 4 - 2a 2 11) e3x _+ (4 - 2a2 + 1) e4x
ex
+ex)5
\ (4a
a 4 e4 + (4a4 + 2a2 _ 1) e3x+
(6a 4 + 2a 2 + 11) e2x +
4 - 2a2 _ i1) e -+ (a 4 - 2a 2 + 1)
= O(x)
We can see that for a > 1 we have
004(x) e (4(a2 _ 1)(, 3 x _ 1) + ex(4a2 + 44)(ex - 1)) < 0
Oa a5 (1 + ex)5
We can also check that:
(a4 - 2a 2 + 1) + (4a 4 - 2a 2 - 11) +
(6a4 + 2a2 + 11) e2Ax + a4 -+ (404 + 2a2 _ 1)
2
To finish the proof, notice that
ex (a4 - 2a2 + 1) e4x + (4a4
+ ev) 6 ( (Ga4 + 12a 2 + 66) e2x + (4a4 -+ 4a2
+ 4a 2 - 26) e3x+
- 26) e' + (a4 - 2a2 + I
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a4 (1
0(0)
1
32a4
ad~ (1
and that
01'(0) = 4 4 (a4 + a2 + 1) > 0
lim #(x)
AX-+-00
e5x
Ax-oo a4 (1 + e) 5
a4 + (4a4 + 2a 2  1) e-x+
(6a 4 + 2a 2 + 11) e 2x+
(4a4 - 2a 2 -i) e 3x + (a4 - 2a 2 + 1) e
3.7.6 Proof of Proposition 11
Proof. For a < 1 we have that agents play a threshold equilibrium. In this case the mass of agents
entering sector 1 will be M 1 (a, a) F(&)
-ea if a < 02
- e-4a ifa ;>0
Next, we can rewrite the socially optimal entry level to sector 1 as
Mf (a)
S A1 + A2 1+e4
where & = In A1 - In A 2 .
We can see that fora < 0 M 1 (0, )=1/2 > , while M 1 (1, a) S = ea (j - I < 0.
We can also see that aM(a,a) _ gaa < 0. Putting this together with the continuity of M (a,&)
with respect to a implies there is a unique -d E (0, 1) such that Mi(a, a) = Mf(&).
When & > 0, M1 (0, a) 1/2 < 1c', while M1(1,a) - 1 - 2(1+en) (1
also check that aMi(a,o) i-aa > 0, which together with the continuity of M 1 (a, ) with respect
to a implies there is a unique a E (0, 1) such that M1(a, a) - MIS(&).
We have that
In
and
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2a 2 + 1)) = 0
lim #(x)
Ax-00
e ) > 0. We can
0
() 1 (lal | ((1 + el'|)
al|l ja| |8P i+elaI in 2
Now, using a taylor expansion we have
In (0> In - YeYy
2 2 1+ e
which implies as > 0.
Finally notice that the equilibrium number of entrants to sector 1 when -a 0 (or a1 = 0.5) is
0.5 independently of the value of a. m
3.7.7 Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. Notice lima #(x) = e.- Also when a -> oo all agents receive a signal x = a and all
agents play the randomizing strategy 6 which implies that the number of agents entering sector
1 is M i()
Now, for & = 0 we have that the number of entrants to sector 1 is
#Ib(x)f(x,a)dx [#(x)F(x,a)j - #'(x)F(x,a)dx
= 1 -0'(x) F(x, a) dz
=1 - # 0'(x)dx
.0
1/2
which shows that M 1 (a, 0) = Mj (0). *
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3 Appendix 2: Figures and Tables
Figure 1. Equilibrium Entry Probability as a Function of the Signal
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Figure 2. Equilibrium Entry as a Function of the Precision and ai, a < 1
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Figure 3. Difference between Equilibrium Entry And Socially Optimal Entry
as a Function of the Precision and al, a < 1
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Figure 4. Equilibrium Entry as a Function of the Precision and eel, a > 1
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Figure 5. Difference between Equilibrium Entry And Socially Optimal Entry
as a Function of the Precision and a, a > 1
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